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RETHINKING THE RENTER/OWNER DIVIDE  
IN PRIVATE GOVERNANCE 
 




The revered status of American homeownership has deep and 
seemingly impenetrable roots. In our modern mythology/reality, the 
castles that shelter and nurture our pursuit of the good life are under 
siege. A narrative common to both popular media accounts and a 
burgeoning property literature warns that private homeowners’ 
associations hold dominion over millions of Americans, dictating what 
they may do with their property and foreclosing when they cannot pay 
association fees or fines. In response to this threat, legislatures, courts, 
and academics are fighting to stave off these intrusions by the content 
and use of constraining servitudes. In focusing on the harms to property 
owners, these critics have unjustifiably omitted renters—a large and 
growing segment of the population. Nearly every American rents living 
space at some stage of life, and rentals are expanding as the real estate 
market continues on its uncertain trajectory. Tenants have no less lofty 
life goals than do homeowners, yet they, too, are governed by private 
rules for property use that severely limit certain property uses and allow 
termination of their property interest through eviction or sale. The rules 
in rental communities, moreover, serve fundamentally the same purpose 
as those set by homeowners associations, which is to control neighbors’ 
uses to increase property value. The key difference between the two types 
of communities, beyond simple physical layout, lies in tradition: a 
woman’s home is her castle, but her apartment is her rickety tenement. 
Even this distinction is vanishing, however, as private communities with 
now-familiar “intrusive” rules continue their decades-old proliferation, 
objections notwithstanding. If, then, private governance of property is 
fundamentally problematic, it is no less problematic for renters. But if, as 
seems more likely, we are generally willing to accept certain private 
rules in communities as a reasonable response to the interests of both 
owners and tenants, critics of private governance must explain why 
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traditional notions of property should prevail over a modern approach to 




From its feudal roots in seisin, fee simple ownership—originally symbolized 
by the transfer of dirt from one owner’s hands to another—has enjoyed an almost 
mythological status. America has rejected most meaningful differences between 
the property use rights of a fee simple owner and those of a nonfreehold lessee,1 
yet we have clung to to the notion that a man’s house is his castle.2 This idea has 
become a partial reality as we have perpetuated it, albeit far from perfectly, 
through our laws. It has been sorely tested, however, as nearly one-fifth of 
Americans3 have contracted for detailed and seemingly intrusive private 
governance of property through condominiums and private subdivisions (private 
communities).4 In response to this threat to our cherished ideal, there have been 
loud, persistent, and sometimes-successful calls to rein in the perceived injustice of 
these proliferating private regimes. 
Indeed, policymakers and attorneys have expressed growing consternation 
about elderly or lonely homeowners who cannot own pets5 and politically 
                                                 
1 See D. Benjamin Barros, Toward a Model Law of Estates and Future Interests, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 12–13 (2009) (observing that “the freehold-leasehold distinction 
no longer has any legal significance”). 
2 Cf. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *288 (“[E]very man’s house is 
looked upon by the law to be his castle.”). 
3 ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, at xiii (2005). “Private” communities, traditionally defined as 
communities governed by private covenants, conditions, and restrictions and some form of 
private association, have existed for more than half a century in the United States and 
began to gain more attention as they became more common. The number of these 
communities exploded from approximately 500 in 1962 to 20,000 by 1975, and to 300,800 
communities by 2008. See Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 697, 771 nn.68–70 (2010) (citing EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER 
ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 11 (1994)); Industry 
Data, COMMUNITY ASS’NS INST., http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/ 
default.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2012); see also Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel, Trust 
and Community: The Common Interest Community as Metaphor and Paradox, 72 MO. L. 
REV. 1111, 1116–17 (2007) (describing the growth of private communities). 
4 The traditional definition of private community only includes private subdivisions, 
condominiums, and cooperatives. See infra Part II. 
5 See, e.g., Armand Arabian, Condos, Cats, and CC&Rs: Invasion of the Castle 
Common, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1995) (discussing the dissent that the author wrote—
while serving as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court of California—in Nahrstedt v. 
Lakeside Village Condominium Association, Inc., 878 P.2d 1275, 1278–79 (Cal. 1994) (in 
bank), referencing the American dream and arguing that denying condominium owners the 
right to own pets imposed a substantial burden on some owners with only a minimal 
benefit to the larger community). 
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concerned or religious owners barred from posting signs or symbols in their 
windows and yards.6 The Third Restatement of Property, for instance, would 
protect the homeowner’s freedom from unnecessary design controls in servitudes 
because “[l]ong tradition supports the individual’s right to determine the aesthetic 
qualities of the home.”7 California once allowed every owner in a private 
subdivision or condominium to have one pet.8 Many states, in turn, prevent private 
property owners’ associations (POAs) from banning solar panels or clotheslines,9 
while newspapers berated the POA that initiated foreclosure proceedings against 
an active military service member after his wife forgot to pay association dues.10 
The federal government, too, bars various associations from restricting owners 
from flying the American flag.11 
A robust private community literature has similarly focused on POAs, with 
some scholars, like Professor Gerald Frug, arguing that they problematically allow 
humans to indulge selfish expectations—thus encouraging exclusivity, latent 
discrimination, and antiredistributive attitudes12—and others worrying that private 
governance forces people into intrusive property rules that they do not fully 
understand or simply should not have to endure, ultimately dashing their hopes for 
property ownership.13 On the other side of the debate, Professor Robert Ellickson 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, Religion-Free Environments in Common Interest 
Communities, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 57, 58, 89 (2010) (arguing that common interest 
community restrictions on religious symbols on homes’ exteriors or in yards “violate 
human dignity, undermine the common good, and deny the critical role of private property 
in protecting religious exercise” and that “[r]eligious exercise on one’s property, like 
political participation through the posting of yard signs, represents a basic societal norm”); 
Paula A. Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest Communities and 
the Rise of Government for “the Nice,” 37 URB. LAW. 335, 336–37 (2005) (noting with 
criticism detailed rules, including those that ban signs). 
7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.9 cmt. a (2000). 
8 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1360.5(a) (West 2007) (repealed 2012; repeal operative 2014). 
9 See LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Dirty Dishes, Dirty Laundry, and Windy Mills: A 
Framework for Regulation of Clean Energy Devices, 40 ENVTL. L. 859, 881 n.106 (2010) 
(listing states that ban servitudes that prohibit clotheslines or renewable energy devices). 
10 See Valerie Wigglesworth, HOA Foreclosed on Frisco Home of Soldier While He 
Was in Iraq, DALL. MORNING NEWS (June 26, 2010), http://www.dallasnews.com/ 
news/community-news/frisco/headlines/20100626-HOA-foreclosed-on-Frisco-home-of-
4111.ece/. 
11 See 4 U.S.C. § 5 (2006). 
12 See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Privatized Communities and the “Secession of the 
Successful”: Democracy and Fairness Beyond the Gate, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1675, 
1677–78 (2001) (describing how individuals in private communities withdraw financial 
support for public services); Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (1998). 
13 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Conditions of “Voice”: Passivity, Disappointment 
and Democracy in Homeowner Associations, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: 
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 145, 159, 162 (Stephen E. Barton & 
Carol J. Silverman eds., 1994) [hereinafter Alexander, Voice in Homeowner Associations] 
(describing residents’ frustrations with private community governance); EVAN MCKENZIE, 
PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE 
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and other renowned property theorists have argued that subdivisions governed by 
private governments fulfill expectations for property value, community character, 
and neighborhood control.14 
With few exceptions,15 critical reactions to curbed property-use rights have 
ignored the tenant,16 who lives not in a private subdivision or condominium but in 
                                                 
GOVERNMENT (1994) (voicing a variety of concerns, including with the content of rules); 
James L. Winokur, Choice, Consent, and Citizenship, in COMMON INTEREST 
COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 87, 99 (Stephen E. 
Barton & Carol J. Silverman eds., 1994) (arguing that “few prospective owners 
intelligently review the restrictions to which they subject themselves upon acceptance of a 
deed”); Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations 
and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1989) [hereinafter Alexander, Dilemmas of 
Group Autonomy] (expressing concerns about notice of detailed rules); Paula A. Franzese, 
Does It Take a Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness, and the Demise of 
Community, 47 VILL. L. REV. 553, 572–76 (2002) (worrying about zealous enforcement of 
covenants by neighbors and the lack of up-front notice of rules); Franzese & Siegel, supra 
note 3, at 1124–25 (expressing concern that some municipalities offer few options other 
than to join a private community and that the rules within the communities “are more akin 
to an adhesion contract than the product of informed, meaningful choice”); cf. Lee Anne 
Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 847–48, 855, 881–83 (noting 
the benefits of controlling community aesthetic in private communities as well as 
drawbacks, such as insufficient consumer appreciation of rules and changing community 
norms); Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L.  
REV. 1375, 1379 (1994) (noting that private associations and legal treatment of  
these associations may fulfill certain communitarian principles but will not lead to a  
“frictionless society”). 
14 See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 3, at 265–66 (echoing Liebmann’s argument and 
touting the unique local democratic process offered by private associations); Robert C. 
Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1528, 1557–58 
(1982) (advocating against legislative interference with private communities’ choices of 
voting system to protect freedom of contract); Richard Epstein, Covenants and 
Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 906 (1988) (suggesting that covenants “look like 
mini-constitutions”); George W. Liebmann, Devolution of Power to Community and Block 
Associations, 25 URB. LAW. 335, 369 (1993) (arguing that existing public neighborhoods 
should be able to form their own private associations); Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the 
Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to 
Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 877–78 (1999) (suggesting that 
private community governance, as opposed to progressive zoning, “could involve a 
rediscovery of the habits of small scale association of the nineteenth century” and promote 
American democracy); Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory 
Survey, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 263 (1976) (arguing that private associations instill a  
sense of community). 
15 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and 
Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1034–41 (2009) (exploring theories of 
property such as the libertarian and efficiency frameworks; investigating the strange result 
that Congress guarantees that a homeowner, but not a renter, may fly a flag; and analyzing 
the reasons for this); Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 
1056 (2008) (noting “severe constraints” on tenant autonomy but focusing on 
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an apartment or home governed by the equally intrusive private landlord with 
eviction powers. Rental properties are no less common than private subdivisions—
indeed, nearly every American rents at some point, and rentals are increasingly 
popular17 with residents seeking convenient urban living or an alternative to the 
shaky real estate market.18 Further, and more importantly, the governance of a 
multiunit apartment building, which is the most common form of rental property,19 
is fundamentally similar—despite differences in ownership arrangement and 
physical layout—to the governance of a subdivision, the object of central concern 
in the private community literature. 
Both apartment renters and subdivision owners have voluntarily joined a 
community20 of closely packed people, where neighbors are difficult to avoid. 
Partially as a result of these tight living quarters, they have consented to a variety 
of rights-constraining rules that do not remotely resemble the American dream: 
they have agreed, for example, to prohibit themselves from owning pets, posting 
signs, or painting their walls red, and to submit to potential eviction or 
foreclosure21 by a private entity. The private rules that form these communities 
                                                 
homeowners). Some laws focus on tenants and protect them from certain potentially 
intrusive rules. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-52 (LexisNexis 2006) (prohibiting 
landlords from barring the display of political signs). But laws protecting owners abound. 
See, e.g., infra notes 253–256 and accompanying text. 
16 See sources cited supra note 13 (showing scholarship that addresses homeowner, 
but not tenant, concerns). 
17 JOINT CENTER FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL 
HOUSING: MEETING CHALLENGES, BUILDING ON OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2011) (noting that “the 
housing bust and Great Recession have pushed up the share and number of renter 
households” and predicting that “further increases in the renter population are likely”); 
Motoko Rich, Homes Aren’t Selling, but in Apartments, It’s a Landlord’s Market, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2012, at A1 (noting that “[f]amilies who might previously have bought 
homes are . . . staying in rentals longer” and “about two million more households are 
renting” than in 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/business/homes-
arent-selling-but-its-an-apartment-landlords-market.html. 
18 See Todd Newcombe, Renting the New American Dream?, GOVERNING, Nov. 
2010, at 27, 27 (describing the trend of more families renting or buying apartments). 
19 Edward L. Glaeser, Rethinking the Federal Bias Toward Homeownership, 13 
CITYSCAPE, no. 2, 2011, at 5, 5 (“More than 85 percent of single-family dwellings are 
owner occupied; more than 85 percent of dwellings in homes with more than three units  
are rented.”). 
20 As described in more detail in Part I, “community” as used in this Article refers to a 
cluster of living structures that has discrete formal or informal boundaries, including a 
neighborhood, town, city, or private common interest community. This builds from 
Professor Lee Fennell’s use of the “neighborhood aesthetics.” See Fennell, supra note 13, 
at 847; see also Wiseman, supra note 3, at 699–700 & n.5 (employing a similar definition). 
21 See RiverPointe Homeowners Ass’n v. Mallory, 656 S.E.2d 659, 659–61 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2008) (affirming the authority of a POA to foreclose on a lien that resulted from a 
homeowner’s failure to follow proper landscaping procedures and pay the associated fine); 
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 3, at 1118 (“An infraction of the rules can lead to the 
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exist for similar purposes: to reduce annoyances generated by neighbors, to ensure 
daily enjoyment of property, and to allow the landlord or developer—and later the 
POA—to preserve the value of the community as a whole. Although both owners 
and renters may not be choosing specific rules for these reasons—indeed, they 
often may consent to constraints they despise—the rules nonetheless exist largely 
to accomplish these results.22 
Despite these fundamental similarities, the private community literature 
unjustifiably places homeowners on a protective pedestal by omitting renters from 
its ambitious praise and critique of private governance of property.23 In current 
scholarly accounts,24 which overwhelmingly use definitional criteria that should 
logically include rentals, concerns about the impact of private rules and 
enforcement on renters either play second fiddle to impacts on owners or receive 
no attention at all.25 To determine whether this omission can be justified, this 
Article focuses on the most common forms of rental and ownership: the multiunit 
apartment and the single-family home. It explores in depth the differences between 
these two property uses and their significance to the critiques of private 
governance, concluding that while some of these differences matter, they largely 
fail to support special treatment for homeowners. Tenants may not need as much 
notice of freedom-constraining rules, for example, if they generally expect more 
                                                 
imposition of penalties against the homeowner, often in the form of significant fines, the 
denial of the right to use the facilities, and even foreclosure.” (citations omitted)). 
22 Note that this Article uses the term “value preservation” more broadly than would 
the utilitarian literature, following something closer to the human flourishing literature. 
See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 768 (2009); Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to 
Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1243 (2005). 
23 Note that scholars, although not including the multiunit apartment building within 
the private community category, have evaluated renters’ experiences within traditionally 
defined private communities (subdivisions and condominiums). See, e.g., Ellickson, supra 
note 14, at 1544 (observing that private communities exclude renters from voting and 
justifying this choice); Jonathan D. Ross-Harrington, Note, Property Forms in Tension: 
Preference Inefficiency, Rent-Seeking, and the Problem of Notice in the Modern 
Condominium, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 188–90 (2009) (noting the rising number of 
renters of condominium units and describing problems). Most renters, however, do not live 
in homeowners’ and condominium associations. See AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE 
UNITED STATES: 2009, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/ 
h150-09.pdf (showing a total of approximately 35.4 million year-round, occupied housing 
units in rental in 2009); Ross-Harrington, supra, at 188 (explaining that in 2009 more than 
2.1 million condo units were rented). Professor Reichman seems to hint at the similarities 
between owned private communities and rented ones, describing the rise of consumer 
demand for indoor services and common areas in owned communities, similar to those 
found in multiunit apartments. See Reichman, supra note 14, at 260. 
24 See sources cited supra notes 12–14. 
25 But see sources cited supra note 15. 
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property controls than do homeowners26 and can exit unwanted rules more easily.27 
On the whole, however, this close investigation reveals few significant 
dissimilarities beyond simple tradition. Within our old and stubborn property story, 
a person’s house is her castle, but her apartment is her rickety tenement. And while 
tradition can give rise to legitimate concerns about notice in the face of 
homeowner expectations, even these have faded as the subdivision and its rules 
have become a regular feature of American life. 
The Article unfolds in three parts. Part I begins by identifying the essential 
characteristics of private communities—combining existing accounts from the 
literature and proposing a new, more comprehensive sphere that includes rental 
property. This Part then notes the striking similarities between two particular types 
of rented and owned communities that are employed in the comparative model 
presented in this Article: the apartment building and the private subdivision. After 
exploring these similarities, Part II identifies the differences between these types of 
communities, acknowledging distinct landlord, tenant, and owner interests in 
property value, varying spatial characteristics, and other relevant differences. This 
Part concludes that none of the differences appear to justify wholesale omission of 
rentals from the private community sphere, thus requiring an explanation from 
those who would protect owners but not tenants from use-limiting rules. Part III 
then explores potential justifications for excluding renters or limiting their role in 
the private community literature, concluding that with the partial exception of 
notice-based concerns, these accounts fail to rest on legitimate renter-owner 
differences. While this conclusion does not invalidate the existing property 
scholarship, it suggests that scholars exploring the benefits and drawbacks of use-
limiting rules should address a much larger body of private governance, including 
the long-accepted rental. It also opens up important opportunities for  
cross-pollination of private governance lessons between the ownership and  
rental contexts. 
 
I.  PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS AND STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS: 
IDENTIFYING ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE COMMUNITIES 
 
Labeling a community as “private” has several important implications. First, 
it tells us, generally, how courts and legislatures will treat those who govern the 
community and allows us to assess whether we agree with the loose system of 
public oversight for these actors. Many federal and state constitutional provisions 
do not apply to individuals who privately govern property, for example.28 
Compared to municipalities exercising delegated state powers, landlords, 
                                                 
26 This expectation may arise, for example, from multiunit tenants’ rental of smaller 
spaces with shared walls. See infra text accompanying notes 168–170. 
27 See infra text accompanying notes 180–188. 
28 But see John Devlin, Constructing an Alternative to “State Action” as a Limit on 
State Constitutional Rights Guarantees: A Survey, Critique and Proposal, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 
819, 823 (1990) (explaining that “some state courts have applied their state charters to 
private entities”). 
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developers, and POAs also operate under few binding legislative directives, with 
the exception of, for example, the Fair Housing Act,29 constraints on eviction or 
foreclosure procedures,30 and occasional state procedural rules that require 
disclosure of private rules and notice of POA meetings.31 Second, and most 
importantly for this Article, defining a community as “private” places it within a 
broad normative literature that has both praised and maligned private communities 
and proposed a variety of reforms for them. So far, however, this literature has 
ignored rentals,32 failing to note that rental properties fit all of its proffered 
definitions and have purposes and functions that largely parallel those of owned 
private communities. 
This Part places rentals within the literature’s private community sphere, thus 
setting the stage for a framework that enables a broader normative evaluation of 
private governance of property. It introduces and defines the core private 
communities discussed in this paper and explains why including rentals within the 
private community realm is important. The Part concludes by categorizing the 
ways in which the literature has defined private communities and by explaining 
why each definition should naturally include rentals. 
 
A.  Selecting Structural Categories of Comparison 
 
In arguing that privately governed homes and rented properties are essentially 
the same and merit similar treatment, this Article relies largely on structural 
comparisons. It identifies quintessential rented and owned communities governed 
by private entities, explains why both are in fact “private” and could be defined as 
“communities,” and explores potential differences between them that might justify 
the literature’s treatment of homeowners as a favored class, which should allegedly 
be protected from the vagaries of private governance or should enjoy its unique 
benefits. For its categories of “quintessential” owned and rented properties, the 
Article explores two specific types of communities: the multiunit apartment and 
the private subdivision of single-family homes. These are the most common forms 
of rented and owned properties, and they capture many core assumptions about 
rental and ownership, assumptions that have been incorporated—often wrongly—
into law and scholarship. Although some renters live in detached single-family 
                                                 
29 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(c) (2006) (making discrimination in sale or 
rental unlawful). 
30 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.305(2) (West Supp 2012) (prohibiting POA liens 
resulting from fines of less than $1,000); infra note 83 (showing that a majority of states do 
not allow self-help eviction). 
31 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 515B.4-107 (West Supp. 2010) (requiring disclosure of 
servitudes and bylaws before the execution of a purchase agreement for a property); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 55-509.4(A)(ii) (Supp. 2011) (same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.34.332 
(West 2013) (requiring POAs to meet at least once a year and to provide ten days’ notice  
of meetings). 
32 But see sources cited supra note 15. 
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homes or duplexes, and some owners live in condominiums or cooperatives, these 
facts are ignored within the boundaries of this Article. 
As Professor Edward Glaeser has observed, “there is a strong connection 
between homeownership and structure type,” which predominantly involves 
owners of homes, and renters who inhabit units in large, shared buildings.33 One 
economic reason for this trend is that an owner of a single, detached, and relatively 
small unit (the home) internalizes “all the benefits from maintenance,” whereas 
maintenance benefits in large condo buildings—conducted by a management 
association—are divided among all residents.34 Even if the maintenance project 
were so large as to create per capita benefits higher than those that would have 
accrued had the owner done the maintenance in her unit only, this often may not 
occur; “a great deal can go wrong” in large condo projects.35 Whether due to this 
reason or the fact that “multiple owners make coordination costly,” thus pushing 
owners away from units in large, shared structures, more than 86% of detached 
single-family homes in the United States were owned in 2000, while more than 
88% of 20- to 49-family and “50-family or larger” buildings were rented.36 
Beyond structural trends, this Article also ignores owned condominiums and 
cooperatives and rented single-family homes because they offer only a bland 
comparison. The aim is to persuade the reader that what appear to be the most 
divergent of property types—the single-family home in an exclusive subdivision 
and the multifamily apartment in a busy urban setting—are in fact nearly identical 
in terms of their purposes and governance structures.37 While there are many 
counterarguments to this assertion—which are explored in Part II—the Article 
attempts to prove its point from the most difficult comparison, rather than the 
easiest. Many likely would agree that condominium owners and apartment tenants 
have much in common: they more easily bother their neighbors—thus producing 
externalities that require controlling rules—and a third party typically provides 
most building maintenance—thus creating different incentives for upkeep by unit 
tenants. Most may be skeptical, however, that apartment tenants have a good deal 
in common with single-family homeowners with white-picket fences. Here begins 
the project of persuasion. 
 
                                                 
33 Glaeser, supra note 19, at 12. 
34 Id. at 14. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 16 exhibit 1. 
37 This Article employs the multiunit apartment building and the private subdivision 
as models for several reasons. First, most critiques of private communities focus on the 
subdivision, not the condominium or cooperative. Rules that affect single-family homes 
seem to generate the most angst in the literature. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying 
text. Second, it is clear that multiunit apartments are similar to condominiums, and we 
might expect similar rules in those two contexts; this Article embarks upon the more 
difficult comparison to show that even a subdivision of single-family homes created by  
one developer is fundamentally similar to a multiunit apartment building governed by  
one landlord. 
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B.  Placing Rental Properties Within the Private Community Literature 
 
The general distinction between public and private governance in the legal 
literature and jurisprudence has become increasingly blurry38 as municipalities 
contract out traditionally public functions,39 as agency processes increasingly 
incorporate private actors,40 and as public neighborhoods adopt zoning rules that 
are nearly identical to private covenants.41 Indeed, the general consensus in the 
literature seems to be that the distinction is, or should be, dead.42 Rather than 
attempting to artificially distinguish between the private and public spheres, the 
story goes, we should focus on the processes within those spheres and the 
substantive results of those processes. Accountability to the public, fairness, 
efficiency, and effectiveness of governance are the relevant metrics in this new 
world43—not whether an actor is public or private. 
Despite the apparent death of the public-private divide, one tenacious 
distinction has remained, and even grown, within the literature. A rapidly 
expanding body of scholarship has followed the rise of the “private” community 
and has either exalted or bemoaned this trend.44 The scholarship’s definition of 
private community, which precedes its normative analyses, has been sparse, but 
this Part explores the four definitions typically followed. It then identifies how 
rentals fit within each of these definitions and pinpoints the fundamental 
similarities between two privately governed communities: the multiunit apartment 
building and the private subdivision. 
 
                                                 
38 See Mark Cantora, Increasing Freedom by Restricting Speech: Why the First 
Amendment Does Not and Should Not Apply in Common Interest Communities, 39 REAL 
EST. L.J. 409, 410 (2011) (describing the “blurring of the distinctions between the ‘public’ 
and ‘private’”). 
39 See, e.g., Sacha M. Coupet, The Subtlety of State Action in Privatized Child Welfare 
Services, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 85, 86 (2007) (describing the trend in privatization of city child 
welfare services); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 
719–22 (2010) (identifying various scenarios of contracting out services). 
40 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
610–16, 625–30, 639–40, 653–55 (2000) (arguing that we must move beyond the public-
private focus in administrative law). 
41 Wiseman, supra note 3, at 719 (describing how many new zoning rules look 
substantively like servitudes). 
42 See Freeman, supra note 40, at 565, 594 (arguing that “there is neither a purely 
public nor a purely private realm” in administrative law); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of 
the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1350 (1982) 
(describing public-private distinction as having reached “utter decrepitude”). 
43 See Freeman, supra note 40, at 625–30, 639–40, 653–55; Christopher D. Stone, 
Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1441, 1441 (1982) (describing “public/private” as having “slipped into 
memory with the other old favorites”). 
44 See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Rental Properties as Private Governance Systems 
 
The literature follows four core definitions of private community that look 
either to its private governance components (including an association that writes 
and enforces private rules, such as servitudes), the uniquely private functions of 
that community, its fit with the state action test, or, more simply, the extent to 
which the community is open to the public. 
 
(a)  Private Associations, Rules, and Enforcement 
 
Private communities, simply put, “possess much of the power and trappings 
of local municipal government but arise out of private relationships,”45 and the 
property literature has already taken great pains to describe these increasingly 
common governance forms. Most descriptive efforts assign three core 
characteristics to their subject matter: the community must be governed by private 
rules—that is, rules not written by a traditional elected government, such as a city 
council; it must have a private governing entity such as a POA, which is elected 
but is not a traditional public body; and it must grant this entity the power to 
enforce the private rules.46 In a private subdivision—the type of private community 
typically discussed in the literature—a developer writes rules in the form of 
servitudes that run with the land.47 After subdividing lots, she records a plat, 
creates a deed for each lot, and includes identical servitudes in each deed before 
recording it.48 The developer retains control of the subdivision until a certain 
percentage of lots are sold,49 thereby acting like a landlord who enforces her own 
privately written rules. The developer then hands over control of the subdivision to 
a POA and passes her “landlord-type” status to this group.50 Either the association 
or individual homeowners—all private entities—can enforce the servitudes in the 
deeds by notifying noncomplying homeowners of their rule violations, requesting 
corrective action, and resorting to the court if homeowners continue to violate 
                                                 
45 Reichman, supra note 14, at 253. 
46 See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A-112, 
RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 3 (1989) (describing a residential community association 
(RCA) as having “covenants in the ownership deeds that require membership in the 
association,” “a mandatory dues obligation to fund a range of services that may be 
provided by the association,” and “restrictions on the activities of members, enforceable by 
the RCA and the courts”). 
47 URBAN LAND INST., THE HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK 198 (1964) (describing 
the preparation of the servitudes). 
48 Id. at 198–99. 
49 Fennell, supra note 13, at 858 n.157 (describing various accounts of the percentage 
of lots that typically must sell before the developer relinquishes control of the subdivision 
to a POA). 
50 Nelson, supra note 14, at 872 (“In most new associations, the developer retains the 
majority of the votes until the late stages of project development.”). 
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these rules.51 The public municipality in which the subdivision is located also has 
regulatory control of the subdivision through zoning and similar police powers,52 
but the additional layer of private rules and enforcement in the subdivision 
distinguishes it from the underlying public municipality. 
Following this set of essential characteristics, which includes private rules and 
a private enforcing entity layered above a public regime, rental communities are 
clearly private. A landlord, who writes rules in addition to those enacted by a 
public municipality, inserts detailed property use restrictions into a lease. These 
rules, like servitudes, are not created by a traditional public entity such as a city 
council, which follows required rule-writing procedures in open meetings acts and 
other public rule-based protections.53 Instead, the landlord creates the rules within 
a lease and simply declares them to be so; with the tenant’s signature, they become 
enforceable. The landlord—like the developer and POA—enforces the rules 
privately, although she relies on the public backstop of the courts. She informs 
tenants of noncompliance, and if they fail to modify their property uses as 
requested, she typically resorts to a judicial forum for eviction procedures.54 
Although, as Part II will explain, there are important differences between the 
manner in which private rules in rented and owned communities are created and 
enforced, rental communities fit the core characteristics of a community defined by 
its private institutions. 
 
(b)  Traditional Powers, Responsibilities, and Characteristics  
of Private Communities 
 
Rather than looking solely to institutions to define private communities, the 
literature sometimes attempts to identify broader characteristics and functions of 
public governments and to compare these characteristics in order to draw a 
definitional line between the two. This literature suggests that we know a private 
community when we see one, looking to perceived clear differences between 
public and private governance such as “[t]he tiny size of most . . . [POAs],”55 “their 
                                                 
51 Franzese & Siegel, supra note 3, at 1135–37 (2007). 
52 See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 3, at 724 (describing a development that reminds 
owners in the servitudes that they remain subject to city zoning laws). 
53 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 102, 103 (McKinney 2008) (providing that 
“[e]very meeting of a public body shall be open to the general public” and defining “public 
body” as “any entity . . . performing a governmental function for the state or for an agency 
or department thereof, or for a public corporation”); Steven J. Mulroy, Sunlight’s Glare, 78 
TENN. L. REV. 309, 315 & n.27 (2011) (listing the fifty state open-meetings laws). 
54 See Randy G. Gerchick, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process 
a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759, 
777–85 (1994) (describing the typical procedures). 
55 Some property owners’ associations, however, are quite large. Reston, Virginia, for 
example, has a population of approximately sixty thousand. See Who We Are, RESTON 
ASS’N, https://www.reston.org/InsideRA/Governance/WhoWeAre/Default.aspx?qenc=HzT 
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narrow range of functions,” and “the absence of the redistributive, police, 
conscriptive, general welfare taxation, and enforcement privileges characteristic of 
sovereign power.”56 Private communities, the literature notes, also may not use 
force against residents or condemn property.57 
Professor Ellickson takes a more nuanced approach, rejecting the contention 
that most of these characteristics are uniquely public and proposing that the 
meaningful difference between a publicly and privately governed community is 
coercion.58 He observes that individuals voluntarily subject themselves to a private 
community’s rules by choosing to purchase a property to which those rules 
attach,59 whereas individuals may only choose among various cities’ and 
municipalities’ rules. Anyone living in the United States must accept certain 
public, involuntary rules such as municipal taxation or zoning. “Public entities 
have involuntary members when they are first formed”60—someone living in an 
area that the government chooses to incorporate may find herself subject to new 
local taxes and zoning rules, for example. And if a majority votes for new 
municipal regulations, those objecting in the minority have no recourse but to 
exit.61 On the other hand, when a developer first forms a private community the 
new membership in this community is “wholly voluntary.”62 Homeowners may 
choose to purchase property within the community and, in so doing, subject 
themselves to the covenants, conditions, and restrictions that the developer has 
recorded and attached to the property, or they may go elsewhere. 
Combining these broad characteristics of private communities, one finds all of 
the features of a multiunit rental. As with a POA, agreement to the rules governing 
rental property is voluntary, not coercive, assuming tenants do not face severe 
income constraints and landlords lack monopoly powers. Landlords, like POAs, 
may not require residents to join. Landlords also may not condemn property or 
directly arrest or jail tenants, although their powers to refuse lease renewal and 
                                                 
9ACzZbNs%3d&fqenc=DP5lX%2fL7n1MKoJO9wkrIsg%3d%3d#who/ (last visited Oct. 
9, 2012). 
56 Robert G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and “Reasonableness” in Private Law: 
The Special Case of the Property Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 49 (1990). 
57 Wayne S. Hyatt & Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, The Identity Crisis of Community 
Associations: In Search of the Appropriate Analogy, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 589, 
640 (1993). 
58 Ellickson, supra note 14, at 1522 (citing Frank I. Michelman, States’ Rights and 
States’ Roles: Permutations of “Sovereignty” in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 
YALE L.J. 1165 (1977)) (observing that “the modern homeowners association has virtually 
all of the indicia that [Frank] Michelman would have us associate with a [traditional  
public] government”). 
59 Id. at 1524. This assumes that the individual is aware that purchasing the property 
results in the automatic attachment of recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions. 
60 Id. at 1523. 
61 The exit and voice theory was introduced by Albert Hirschman in 1970. See 
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
62 Ellickson, supra note 14, at 1523. 
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convert rental units to condominiums or other purposes (constrained in some states 
by legislatively required tenant buy-out options)63 resemble condemnation 
authority. The landlord of a multiunit apartment complex governs a small territory 
and oversees a narrow range of functions, including rule writing and enforcement, 
maintenance, and limited common services such as landscaping and laundry 
facilities, within this territory. This landlord does not shoulder the broad service 
and regulatory-based responsibilities of a public government. Finally, like the 
members of a community association board, she does not enjoy any of the limited 
immunity that states tend to grant local governments,64 although, as a private actor, 
she is not constrained by many of the laws that limit municipalities’ discretion. 
 
(c)  State Action 
 
Drawing a private community sphere using the features that should 
distinguish it from a traditional public community is an approach rather 
disconnected from the reality of the law. If our goal is to determine why the 
difference matters, we can alternatively begin “with the public/private distinctions 
that present law relies on in fact, and . . . build upward, toward the theoretical 
abstractions and justifications.”65 In the property governance context, this 
practically grounded approach requires a brief analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
state action doctrine, which labels a government as “public” only if it fits an 
increasingly long list of necessary characteristics. This test is thin because of its 
extremely high threshold for “publicness,” but the private community literature 
sometimes uses it as a dividing line.66 
Allegedly private governments may engage in state action, and thus be 
defined as “public,” when they “assum[e] government functions or powers,”67 
                                                 
63 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 559.204 (LexisNexis 2007) (requiring that 
tenants be notified prior to sale of apartments for condominiums, remain within the 
apartment for 120 days or the remainder of the lease, whichever is longer, and to terminate 
the tenancy within 60 days of receiving notice, among other protections). 
64 See, e.g., Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/2-204 (West 
2010) (providing basic municipal immunity); Pelaez v. Seide, 810 N.E.2d 393, 395 (N.Y. 
2004) (explaining that in New York, “As a rule, municipalities are immune from tort 
liability when their employees perform discretionary acts involving the exercise of 
reasoned judgment”); ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra 
note 46, at 16 (“[B]oard members do not have immunity from lawsuits when carrying out 
their official duties.”); Kathryn E. Litchman, Punishing the Protectors: The Illinois 
Domestic Violence Act Remedy for Victims of Domestic Violence Against Police 
Misconduct, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 765, 783–84 (2007) (explaining that the Act remains 
intact despite subsequent constitutional changes). 
65 Stone, supra note 43, at 1444. 
66 See, e.g., Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 57, at 657–61 (applying the state action 
doctrine to common interest communities). 
67 Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 597 (1991); see also David J. Kennedy, Note, Residential 
Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on 
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when there is “joint participation between state officials and private entities,”68 and 
when the conduct of the private entity is essentially the conduct of the state as a 
result of state regulation.69 The actions of private communities also may become 
public when courts enforce private servitudes70 or, potentially, lease provisions. To 
cross the state actor threshold under the public function test, the community’s 
government must “discharge functions ‘traditionally performed’ by and 
‘exclusively reserved to’ government.”71 Most common-interest communities and 
rental communities are solidly “private” under this test.72 Only large, isolated, 
                                                 
Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 787 (1995) (citing S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic 
Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987)) (introducing the public function test). 
68 Strickland, supra note 67, at 597. 
69 Wayne Hyatt and Jo Anne Stubblefield believe that a broader theory of state 
action—the “state involvement” test—may potentially apply to community associations. 
Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 57, at 658. In describing this theory, they appear to refer 
to the “nexus” test in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974), as 
they cite to this case and refer to state statutes regulating the creation of condominiums and 
other common interest communities. Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 57, at 659 n.278. 
The nexus test is distinct from the symbiotic relationship test. See Lillian BeVier & John 
Harrison, The State Action Principle and Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1798 n.61 
(2010); 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1467 (2011) (explaining that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the “‘close nexus test’ differs from the ‘symbiotic relationship test’ in that the 
former focuses on the connection between the state and the specific conduct that allegedly 
violates the plaintiff’s civil rights, whereas the latter focuses on the entire relationship 
between the state and the defendants”). 
70 Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 57, at 658. 
71 See Morse v. Republican Party, 517 U.S. 186, 271 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978)); Strickland, supra note 67, at 
631 (“The Flagg Bros. Court apparently held that in order for a private entity’s activities to 
be deemed state action under the government function theory, the activity must be one 
traditionally undertaken exclusively by the sovereign and it must substantially displace the 
government’s traditional role in that activity.”). The original public function test emerged 
in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502, 506 (1946). 
72 Hyatt and Stubblefield argue that the “overwhelming majority of community 
associations do not have the characteristics necessary to constitute the functional equivalent 
of a municipality.” Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 57, at 661; see also Brock v. 
Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass’n, 502 So. 2d 1380, 1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) 
(concluding that a “homeowner’s association lacks the municipal character of a company 
town” because “the homeowners own their property and hold title to the common areas pro 
rata” and “the services provided by a homeowners association . . . are merely a supplement 
to, rather than a replacement for, those provided by local government”); Laguna Publ’g Co. 
v. Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 825 (Ct. App. 1982) (finding that “Leisure 
World,” a private subdivision of homes, was not a company town—a state actor—for free 
speech purposes because it was “solely a concentration of private residences, together with 
supporting recreational facilities, from which the public is rigidly barred”; noting, however, 
that the subdivision’s attributes “bring it conceptually close to characterization as a 
company town”); Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 57, at 661 n.293 (citing to Brock, 502 
So. 2d 1380); Kennedy, supra note 67, at 784 n.127 (citing to Laguna Publ’g, 182 Cal. 
Rptr. 813). 
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multiuse developments with both businesses and residential units—all governed  
by one private association—may have the characteristics necessary to be  
sufficiently governmental. 
The remaining tests, as they have played out in the courts, offer similarly thin 
definitions.73 An entity is a state actor and thus public under the symbiotic 
relationship test when the actor has “so far insinuated itself into a position of 
interdependence with [the private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint 
participant in the challenged activity.”74 In an extreme yet rare example, a 
California municipality worked with a developer to restrict the number of 
occupants in homes and place minimum age requirements on occupants,75 thus 
pushing the developer into public territory under this test. Although developers 
often implement servitudes with age restrictions, they rarely do so in concert with a 
public local government.76 Landlords, similarly, often have an insufficiently strong 
relationship with the government to be a state actor, unless, perhaps, they lease 
property from the government and rent it to residents, or are centrally involved in a 
government-subsidized rental housing program. 
Similar to the symbiotic relationship test, a landlord or POA can become a 
state actor when the government directs its actions, typically through heavy or 
coercive regulation,77 and thus creates “a sufficiently close nexus between the State 
and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may 
be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”78 Indeed, states regulate some 
meaningful aspects of common interest communities,79 controlling the conditions 
for creating condominiums, for example, and sometimes defining POAs’ 
                                                 
73 See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357–58 (1974) (showing that 
the symbiotic relationship test may only apply to a lessee-lessor relationship between the 
government and the actor); Strickland, supra note 67, at 624 (“Perhaps because of the 
theory’s ambiguity, the Court has not really used [the symbiotic relationship test] to find 
state action since deciding Burton [v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.  
715 (1961)].”). 
74 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). The doctrine has 
since changed, potentially in confusing ways. Justice O’Connor, dissenting in a more 
recent case, argued that for the state to have been in a symbiotic relationship with a private 
enterprise, it must have “affirmatively influenced or coerced the private party to undertake 
the challenged action.” Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 411 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
75 Park Redlands Covenant Control Comm’n v. Simon, 226 Cal. Rptr. 199, 206–07 
(Ct. App. 1986); Kennedy, supra note 67, at 786 (describing the case). 
76 See EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED 
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 49–52 (1999) (describing retirement communities 
created by developers through covenants, conditions, and restrictions with minimum  
age requirements). 
77 See 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1466 (2011). 
78 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351; see also BeVier & Harrison, supra note 69, at 1798 n.61 
(identifying the nexus test as a distinct state action test and citing to Jackson). 
79 Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 57, at 659–60. 
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foreclosure powers.80 States similarly regulate a variety of rental actions, from 
minimal health and safety requirements to eviction procedures.81 But this test, 
again, is unlikely to push most private governments into the public sphere. Indeed, 
if an electric utility—a natural monopoly that is both endorsed and highly 
regulated by the state—does not operate under sufficient state control to create the 
necessary nexus,82 then it would be difficult to say that private communities have 
the nexus that implicates state action. 
A final means of differentiating truly private actors from public ones under 
the state action test is to look to their reliance on courts for rule enforcement. 
Taken to the extreme, this doctrine would force all private communities, both 
rented and owned, into the public sphere; all community leaders must resort to 
courts for rule enforcement if informal efforts break down.83 Indeed, the Middle 
District of Florida follows a rule, at least in First Amendment cases, that “judicial 
enforcement of private agreements contained in a declaration of condominium 
constitutes state action.”84 In light of most courts’ narrow application of Shelley v. 
Kraemer,85 however, courts likely will rarely find state action when a POA 
                                                 
80 Golden Sands Club Condo., Inc. v. Waller, 545 A.2d 1332, 1336 n.5 (Md. 1988) 
(discussing due process requirements for a condominium association to impose 
foreclosable lien against units under Maryland law). 
81 See Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 
23 B.C. L. REV. 503, 504–05 (1982) (concluding that “[t]he decisive element in the 
transformation of the residential landlord-tenant relationship has been its subjection to 
pervasive, mostly statutory, regulation of it incidents,” including “rent regulation, security 
of tenure for the tenant, and the qualification of the landlord’s traditional rights to alienate 
the freehold or to convert it to another use”). 
82 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352. 
83 Kennedy, supra note 67, at 786 (“State involvement is implicated in the frequent 
enforcement by the state of the association’s governing documents.”); Kara B. Schissler, 
Note, Come and Knock on Our Door: The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s Intrusion 
into New York’s Summary Proceedings Law, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 315, 328 n.67 (2000) 
(explaining that only “a minority of states still allow landlords to employ self-help—the 
use of all necessary and reasonable force—to evict a tenant”). 
84 Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo., 757 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 1991) 
(relying on Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)). 
85 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Although the Court in Shelley v. Kraemer blocked courts from 
enforcing racially restrictive covenants, finding that residents’ reliance on courts to enforce 
the private servitudes removed the servitudes from the private sphere, courts have not 
tended to extend Shelley’s reasoning beyond discriminatory covenants. See Hyatt & 
Stubblefield, supra note 57, at 658–59. Hyatt and Stubblefield note that some courts have 
limited Shelley’s holding to racially restrictive covenants; others have applied the holding 
to all discriminatory covenants, and still others have extended it further. For a case finding 
state action when trial courts enforced a private community’s age restriction (and 
upholding the restriction under rational basis equal protection review), see Riley v. Stoves, 
526 P.2d 747, 752 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974), and Kennedy, supra note 67, at 784 n.128 (citing 
to Riley, 526 P.2d 747). Landlords’ use of the courts to enforce lease rules will, similarly, 
typically not make them state actors under Shelley. In Knubbe v. Sparrow, 808 F. Supp 
1295 (E.D. Mich. 1992), for example, a landlord, following state eviction procedures, 
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requests an injunction under a covenant or a landlord commences an eviction 
action. 
 
(d)  Openness to the Public 
 
One state has jettisoned the state action doctrine, at least in the context of 
expression, for a test similar to California’s approach validated in PruneYard 
Shopping Center v. Robins86: New Jersey law creates a public-private dividing line 
based largely upon a community’s openness to the public. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court, unlike most states,87 does not require that an entity be a state actor 
before subjecting it to the free speech requirements of the New Jersey Constitution; 
rather, it applies a three-part test that looks to the “normal use” of the private 
property, the extent to which the public has been invited onto the property, and the 
connection between the expressional activity and the private and public uses on the 
property.88 In a homeowners’ association, the normal use of the property is 
residential and thus private; the public has not been invited to the premises 
(particularly in a gated community); and if homeowners are, for example, 
prohibited from posting signs in their yards, this speech relates to the manner of 
management of the private community—not a broader, public matter. A private 
subdivision is unlike a private property to which the public is invited for “public 
commerce” or “academic discourse.”89 Thus, a private homeowners’ association 
may ban most signs in yards without offending the New Jersey Constitution.90 The 
rules relate to the private use of the property and exist for good reason: “The 
mutual benefit and reciprocal nature of those rules and regulations, and their 
enforcement, is essential to the fundamental nature of the communal living 
arrangement that [POA] residents enjoy.”91 The same could be said of rental 
communities, which exist for private residential purposes, do not invite the broader 
public onto the premises for the purpose of exchanging ideas and speech, and, like 
                                                 
obtained a court order that tenants be evicted and pay restitution; the tenants argued that the 
landlord had “wrongfully secured” the writ of restitution under state law. Id. at 1302. The 
Eastern District of Michigan found that “[w]hile the procedures established by a statute are 
the products of state action, a private party’s misuse of a state statute is not state action.” Id. 
at 1301. 
86 447 U.S. 74 (1980); id. at 81–82 (holding that although inviting the public onto 
property does not automatically subject the property to constitutional requirements, states 
may more vigorously define and protect free speech rights and require a shopping center to 
allow individuals to exercise speech and petition rights there). 
87 Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 929 A.2d 
1060, 1071 (N.J. 2007) (“[T]he vast majority of other jurisdictions that have interpreted a 
state constitutional provision with language similar to our constitution’s free speech 
provision require ‘state action’ as a precondition to imposing constitutional obligations on 
private property owners.”). 
88 Id. at 1072. 
89 Id. at 1073. 
90 Id. at 1074. 
91 Id. at 1073. 
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POAs, contain “residents [who] have contractually agreed to abide by the common 
rules and regulations.”92 
In sum, whether one looks to the various strands of the narrow state action 
doctrine or to more comprehensive definitions of privateness applied in the 
literature, the landlord-tenant relationship is a quintessentially private governance 
system. Rental properties, like private subdivisions, contain private rules in a lease 
and rely on a nongovernmental entity (a landlord) and ultimately the courts for 
enforcement. Landlords, like community associations, cannot force residents into 
agreeing to rules; they lack the coercive authority of a public government. Just as a 
homeowner who dislikes particular subdivision rules may opt out of buying a 
home in a particular private community (assuming that she is mobile and there are 
other housing options), a tenant (assuming the same conditions) may reject a rental 
if she dislikes the rules in a lease. Landlords also tend to govern smaller territories 
than do public governments,93 and they lack the traditional sovereign powers of a 
public government, although, as discussed in Part II, they wield broad powers and 
are likely to affect property use more powerfully than a local public government. 
Finally, just as the few courts that have addressed constitutional challenges to 
private governmental decisions have tended to omit community associations from 
the state actor category,94 courts will rarely label landlords as public. 
 
2.  Identifying the “Community” in Both Rented and Owned Private Properties 
 
The private governance sphere carved out in the law and literature of private 
communities clearly should include rentals, but one might reasonably object that 
tenants do not fall within traditional understandings of community despite their 
communal nature. The multifamily rental exhibits the same communal 
characteristics seen in a private subdivision, although it is debatable whether these 
characteristics fall within traditional understandings of community. 
Not all private communities are true communities, which possess the warm 
characteristics typically associated with community such as inclusiveness, 
communication, generosity, and, more generally, a shared spirit of togetherness.95 
Both types of rented and owned properties highlighted in this Article are formed, 
however, in part for the purpose of creating these types of cohesive 
environments.96 While many tend to think of private subdivisions as uniform rows 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 Some apartment complexes are, however, larger than towns in terms of population. 
94 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
95 See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 273–74 (2000) (defining community and suggesting similar 
attributes); Richard G. Lorenz, Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors, 33 URB. LAW. 45, 48–
49 (2001) (defining community by its functions, including the need to “provide a human 
interaction” and “to bring together different types of people”). 
96 Alternatively, even when a developer does not intend to form a community, one 
may form anyway. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 14, at 262–63 (noting that the structure 
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of beige houses and rental spaces as bland multiunit apartments, developers and 
landlords offer a variety of private communities, from eco-spaces to international 
houses and artists’ cooperatives.97 Many, in turn, allow for chance interactions 
with neighbors in common areas or offer periodic community meals and volunteer 
days.98 Indeed, developers often advertise that their spaces provide various forms 
of real community. Crystal Manor, a private subdivision of affordable homes in 
Citrus County, Florida, for example, claims, “The neighborhood children run from 
house to house playing games while the adults share a block party barbecue and 
everyone knows everyone.”99 The Rosecrest master-planned community in Utah 
similarly advertises “[a] place that, by its very design, fosters relationships and 
recreates the close-knit neighborhoods of a bygone era.”100 
Landlords, too, claim that their apartment buildings foster community. 
Atlantic Heights in Barnegat, New Jersey, describes how residents can “engage in 
some friendly competition on either the outdoor basketball court or tennis 
court,”101 and The Gables in Washington, DC, proclaims, “Get More Than An 
Apartment, Get A Real Community!!!”102 
Private communities, while aiming (or merely claiming) to create true 
communities, also might encourage individuals to be more active participants in 
shaping their collective space and values. Civic virtue is nearly always linked to 
homeowners in the literature, but when one controls for the duration of residence 
or the stability of an individual’s living situation, homeowners might not in fact be 
significantly better civic participants than renters.103 While renters may be 
somewhat less likely than homeowners to “help solve local problems, know the 
                                                 
of the homeowners’ association could unwittingly provide a mechanism for reversing the 
anticommunity trends of the last century). 
97 See, e.g., Cohousing Directory, COHOUSING, http://www.cohousing.org/directory/ 
view/20598/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) (describing a green, privately governed community 
in New Hampshire). 
98 See, e.g., CROOKED RIVER RANCH CLUB & MAINTENANCE ASS’N, 
http://www.crookedriverranch.com/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2012) (describing community 
events such as a brown bag event and a farmers’ market within the private community); 
OZARK N. SHORES, http://www.ozarknorthshores.com/community.html (last visited Oct. 3, 
2012) (describing monthly POA potlucks); What’s Happening Around the Ranch..., PROP. 
OWNERS ASS’N OF TERLINGUA RANCH, INC. (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.poatri.org/ 
events.html (on file with author) (describing community pools, concerts, and volunteer 
opportunities, among other events). 
99 Crystal Manor, COSGROVE BUILDERS, http://www.homesbycosy.com/crystal_manor.htm 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
100 ROSECREST, http://www.rosecrestutah.com/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
101 Luxury Style and Comfort, ATLANTIC HEIGHTS, http://www.atlanticheights.com/ 
community.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
102 Get More Than an Apartment, Get a Real Community!!! Pets Welcome!!!, 
CRAIGSLIST (Sept. 3, 2011), http://washingtondc.craigslist.org/nva/apa/2580520363.html 
(on file with author). 
103 See Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 890, 903 (2011). 
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head of their school board, and engage in neighborhood activism,” these 
differences are modest.104 Renters also participate in local political and social 
organizations at a rate and intensity comparable to homeowner participation.105 In 
short, the view of renters as disinterested citizens who care little about their 
communities is not always accurate. Renters, like homeowners, may demand 
private governance structures that provide them with a voice in community 
decisions. Those lacking tenants’ rights groups or similar self-governance 
mechanisms have fewer opportunities for participation in community decisions 
than do POA members, and this may need to change. 
Having considered both the “private” and “community” elements of the 
private community law and literature, it appears that rentals fall squarely within 
both elements of this definitional sphere, and this will have important implications 
moving forward. It suggests a re-evaluation of the literature and suggests how 
lessons from two types of classic private communities—the apartment building 
and the private subdivision—may be particularly relevant in both communities. If 
state laws should constrain POAs’ discretion to enforce private rules against 
homeowners, for example, perhaps they should similarly limit landlords’ 
enforcement powers, or at least give tenants opportunities to form associations and 
to have more voice in enforcement priorities and techniques. To ensure recognition 
of a new, more inclusive category of private governance within the property 
literature, we could perhaps label this new, broader evaluative space as the 
“privately governed community.” This Article, however, continues the use of the 
shortened term “private community” and expands its reach. 
 
C.  Identifying the Fundamentally Similar Purposes and Features  
of Rented and Owned Private Communities 
 
The fact that both rented and owned private communities meet the existing 
litmus tests for privateness is unsurprising. When we focus on the quintessential 
rental community—the multiunit apartment building—and its counterpart in the 
ownership context—the private subdivision—striking similarities emerge.106 At 
their core, both communities aim toward the same central goal of maximizing 
collective property values. Indeed, POAs, which shrink collective action problems 
by acting for the community as a whole, behave much like landlords. Rented and 
owned communities can also both reduce externality conflicts, protect the aesthetic 
and “emotional” character of the community (defining a space as lively or quiet, 
for example), attempt to offer a “true community,”107 encourage civic participation, 
and provide common services. Despite these laudable goals, individuals in both 
                                                 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 904, 906. 
106 See supra Part I.A (explaining why this Article does not discuss condominiums 
and single-family rented homes). 
107 For skepticism about the ability for private communities to offer “true” 
communities and a definition, see Wiseman, supra note 3, at 708 n.44. 
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types of communities may end up despising the detailed rules to which they have 
committed themselves through a deed or lease—thus requiring further 
consideration (provided in Part III) of the merits of the private governance system 
and the rules that it creates. The following subparts flesh out these strong and as-
yet unexplored similarities between the purposes of rented and owned private 
communities, and of the private rules that form these communities. 
 
1.  Protecting Property Values 
 
The extent to which private rules and enforcement actually maintain property 
values in the homeownership context is heavily debated.108 Those writing the rules 
in both rented and owned communities, however, seem to believe that the rules 
protect against value losses, and they largely write them for this purpose.109 
Landlords collectively control the actions of individual residents to preserve long-
term property value and guarantee short-term rental income by attracting 
residents.110 Indeed, recent economic models suggest that landlords are 
incentivized to maintain property to avoid vacancy and lost rent,111 and rules 
support this maintenance. Similarly, POAs control individual households to protect 
neighborhood property values,112 which are largely determined by the actions of 
neighbors—hence the “location, location, location” mantra in real estate. 
                                                 
108 Professor Lee Fennell observes, for example, that homeowners tend to be overly 
risk averse, constraining too many property uses and modifications. Fennell, supra note 13, 
at 870–73. 
109 Id. at 858, 875 (describing how developers implement large rule sets in hopes of 
preserving property value). 
110 See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Community Economic Development Movement, 
2002 WIS. L. REV. 377 (describing pleasant, low-income rental communities). But cf. 
Hanoch Dagan, Inside Property, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4 (2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2006737/ (noting that “modern landlord-tenant law is interested in 
addressing not only the vulnerability of landlords to the possible opportunism of tenants” 
but also “is preoccupied with the ability of landlords to affect the conditions of the 
premises,” thus describing how public law affects this core purpose of the landlord’s 
private rules). 
111 Glaeser, supra note 19, at 13 (noting that landlords “have the same long-run price 
incentives [as do owners] and they benefit from the higher rent that they can charge as a 
result of maintenance”); Thomas J. Micelli & C.F. Sirmans, Efficiency Rents: A New 
Theory of the Natural Vacancy Rate for Rental Housing 1–3 (Univ. of Conn. Working 
Paper No. 2010-30, 2010), available at http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/2010-30.pdf. 
But see Glaeser, supra note 19, at 14 (noting that landlords often conduct maintenance 
themselves for economic reasons). This may detract from the argument that landlords will 
use rules to ensure upkeep and to preserve value; although even if the landlord provides the 
maintenance, she will not want a sloppy tenant to reverse these benefits. 
112 See, e.g., Caitlin S. Dyckman, The Covenant Condundrum in Urban Water 
Conservation, 40 URB. LAW. 17, 22–23 (2008) (“[C]ovenants that run with the land have 
come into widespread use for larger developments . . . because the developer can assure the 
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Both renters and homeowners would, generally speaking, prefer to have 
unfettered freedom to do what they like with their living space, be it planting 
cactus in the lawn or owning six cats. One consideration, however, ultimately 
trumps this preference for individual freedom: neighbors’ uses, which annoy the 
individual occupant on a daily basis and may negatively affect property value, 
collectively motivate individual owners to seek out a third-party entity to regulate 
these uses, and they lead renters to accept restrictive lease conditions.113 
By creating a set of rules up front, to which prospective tenants or 
homebuyers sign on, both rented and owned private communities avoid the 
transaction costs incurred by neighbors individually contracting for rules.114 
Further, they eliminate the free rider problems associated with rule enforcement in 
areas with shared space: one resident’s enforcement of a servitude or lease 
provision would benefit all members of the community, and the resident could not 
exclude others from this benefit. The POA or the landlord of a multiunit apartment 
building avoids this barrier by centrally enforcing shared rules. 
 
2.  Reducing Externality Conflicts and Preserving Community Character 
 
Many property uses, from cactus growing to cat keeping, have effects that 
drift beyond the walls of an individual home or the boundaries of a yard—effects 
that both impact property values and, relatedly, individuals’ daily enjoyment of 
property. These are the “neighbor externalities” that finally push the individual to 
cede freedom of property use to collective control. Backyard grills send smoke 
onto neighboring porches, and a television blaring in a living room can interrupt a 
neighbor’s peaceful dinner. Although nuisance law and public zoning regulations 
control many of these externalities—and indeed, some zoning laws have become 
quite detailed in their restrictions115—they may fail to prevent a variety of 
activities that bother neighbors.116 
                                                 
quality and marketability of the product until all units are sold, even if construction and 
sales occur over a period of years . . . .”). 
113 See Cantora, supra note 38, at 424 (“People join [common interest communities 
(CICs)] for the express purpose of living in a situation in which everyone will have some 
rights restricted so that everyone will have some other benefits expanded.”); Susan French, 
The Constitution of a Private Residential Government Should Include a Bill of Rights, 27 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 347 (1992) (“Americans have been willing to give up some 
degree of freedom to secure the advantages of ownership in common interest 
communities.”). 
114 See Epstein, supra note 14, at 907–15 (explaining that “recordation and common 
plan building schemes” have reduced the transaction costs of contracting for shared spaces 
and associated covenants). 
115 See, e.g., Kenneth Pearlman et al., Beyond the Eye of the Beholder Once Again: A 
New Review of Aesthetic Regulation, 38 URB. LAW. 1119, 1122–49 (2006) (describing 
states’ approval of aesthetic zoning, including billboards); Wiseman, supra note 3, at 719–
20 (describing the expansion of zoning to protect architectural features). 
116 See NELSON, supra note 3, at 37 (describing the limitations of traditional zoning). 
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Developers and landlords form private communities, at least in part, to 
address this public legal deficiency by implementing a set of uniform rules that 
attaches to each property in a community. Through these uniform rules, the 
communities guarantee a limited range of externalities and allow community 
“consumers” to choose the type of externalities that they most wish to avoid.117 In 
writing rules that apply in addition to those within public zoning and building 
codes, private community governments also aim to promote a certain type of 
community character. Gathering together similar preferences against certain types 
of externalities tends to do this, both by defining a consistent aesthetic and 
supporting less tangible values, such as noise and liveliness. Discerning consumer-
homeowners who despise brightly colored houses can band together in a private 
subdivision,118 and students who dislike the din of late-night parties can select the 
quiet apartment complex. Private communities, both by limiting externalities and 
imposing uniformly detailed rules, endeavor to shape the whole living space—not 
just the physical aesthetic of individual homes or apartments, but also the character 
of the community that surrounds the homes or units.119 As Professor Lee Fennell 
has persuasively argued, living spaces can no longer exist in isolation; property is a 
complex, interwoven web of individual lots or units and their surrounding space,120 
and, to a large extent, the creators of private communities recognize this. 
 
3.  Offering Shared Services and Facilities 
 
In addition to creating rules that protect property values and collect similar 
rule preferences, landlords and developers offer apartment buildings and private 
subdivisions in part to provide common facilities and services for residents, from 
building a courtyard or pool to shoveling snow.121 Several of the subdivisions and 
apartments introduced in Part I.B.2 above, for example, promise amenities such as 
                                                 
117 For a discussion of Charles Tiebout’s community consumer hypothesis in the 
private community context, see Wiseman, supra note 3, at 727–39; Fennell, supra note 13, 
at 857–60. 
118 See Fennell, supra note 13, at 857 (explaining that “people who enjoy fixing cars 
could enter one community, while people who enjoy displaying and viewing concrete 
gnomes could enter a different community”). 
119 See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 46, at 4 
(noting that developers of residential community associations “are able to produce more 
attractive and marketable homes, which include a livable environment, not just a house”); 
James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing 
Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1, 3 
(“[R]estrictions serve the significant salutory purpose of maintaining a desirable character 
and quality in many residential areas.”). 
120 See LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND 
PROPERTY LINES (2009). 
121 ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 46, at 12 
(“RCAs commonly provide a variety of services . . . .”). 
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maintenance, landscaping, clubhouses, picnic areas, and fitness centers.122 Many 
homeowners list maintenance services and shared facilities as a primary reason for 
joining a private subdivision,123 and renters likely have similar motivations. 
Considered together, the collective purposes and functions of rented and 
owned private communities are similar in important ways. POAs in private 
subdivisions largely mimic the older, more established private governance model 
of the landlord of the multiunit building, who provides one set of rules, one 
enforcer, and common services and facilities. Individuals in both types of 
communities may not, in the end, enjoy the rules to which they have agreed. As 
discussed in Part III, those who are unaware of or do not fully understand the rules 
that they commit to when renting or buying in a private community may 
experience an unpleasant shock when they learn of the intrusiveness of the rules—
and homeowners, in particular, may not anticipate the rules. Regardless of their 
satisfaction with the constraints imposed, however, tenants and buyers in private 
communities both experience a common element: a detailed set of rules uniformly 
limiting all community occupants’ uses of their individual properties, and a central, 
private entity that enforces the rules. 
Identifying rental governance as a private system matters because, inter alia, it 
highlights the “tension between private volition and social control”124 that 
Professor Richard Epstein has identified as a persistent theme in law. Having 
labeled a community as private, normative questions arise as to exactly how much 
discretion we should grant to private actors, who, by definition, wield regulatory 
powers without the checks traditionally placed on public officials; 125 whether these 
communities are good for society as a whole; and whether and why the rules 
within these communities benefit the community consumers who are choosing to 
live there.126 
                                                 
122 Get More Than an Apartment, Get a Real Community!!! Pets Welcome!!!, supra 
note 102 (advertising, among other features, on-site management, business center, fitness 
center, BBQ/Picnic Area, and a clubhouse); Luxury Style and Comfort, supra note 101 
(advertising, among other features, emergency twenty-four-hour maintenance, tot lot and 
play area, BBQ area, fitness center, tennis court, clubhouse, and landscaping throughout 
the seasons); Our-Community, ROSECREST COMMUNITIES, http://www.rosecrest 
communities.com/our-community/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (advertising, among other 
features, “10+ miles of improved trails,” “clubhouses,” and “maintenance-free living”). 
123 See PHILIP A. VANNO, ZOGBY INT’L, FOUNDATION FOR COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION 
RESEARCH TRACKING POLL 15 (2007) (showing “maintenance-free” as one of the best 
aspects of living in community associations). 
124 Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1353 (1982). 
125 For a detailed discussion of the limits of a private group’s autonomy and the 
conflict between allowing factions to fulfill their preferences and governing these factions’ 
external relations with the larger community, see Alexander, Dilemmas of Group 
Autonomy, supra note 13. 
126 For a general discussion of the extent to which consumers actively “choose” 
communities, as opposed to mistakenly falling into them, see Wiseman, supra note 3. 
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The literature has conducted this essential analysis for owned communities—
one category within the private governance sphere in property—but it has 
consistently ignored rentals.127 Part II evaluates this omission by developing a 
framework of the relevant differences between rented and owned communities. 
Although some of the differences are meaningful, none justify the exclusion of 
rentals from the private community literature. 
 
II.  IDENTIFYING MEANINGFUL RENTER-OWNER DIFFERENCES 
 
The functional similarities between rented and owned private communities 
open the door for many shared concepts that have not yet been explored. State laws 
requiring POAs to provide notice to owners of meetings and offer open 
meetings,128 for example, may be relevant for tenants demanding some self-
governance responsibilities, such as the ability to agree on and request 
modifications of lease rules. The similarities also show that the private community 
literature, in omitting the entire rental field from its discussions, is missing a very 
important thread and should perhaps reconsider some of its core assumptions. If 
intrusive rules, arbitrary enforcement, and harsh punishments (including 
foreclosure) are problematic for owners, then it would be beneficial for the 
literature to explore why renters do not merit similar, if not identical, treatment. 
Not all lessons from private subdivisions will transfer logically to the 
multiunit complex, of course, and landlord-tenant law, while offering fruitful 
comparisons for private subdivisions, will likely be irrelevant in some ownership 
contexts. A framework is therefore necessary to identify just how inclusive the 
new sphere of private governance of property may be—and whether it matters that 
the literature has omitted renters from this sphere. The framework developed in 
this part serves this purpose, allowing us to determine whether the literature’s 
homeowner focus is justified and to locate the areas of private governance that are 
ripest for comparison. The framework hints that none of the differences fully 
justify omission of renters from normative discussion of private communities or 
prevent the effective transfer of lessons from one community to another—a 
conclusion explored in detail in Part III. 
 
A.  Different Structural Mechanisms 
 
The clearest factor that differentiates rented from owned communities is 
simply that, although they have similar types of governance structures and rules, 
the mechanisms for creating and enforcing the rules in each community differ 
substantially. When created, for example, rules encapsulate different levels of 
input from those governed by them, and enforcement actions flow from different 
incentives in the two types of private communities. 
                                                 
127 But see supra note 23 (discussing renters’ experiences within owned  
private communities). 
128 See sources cited supra note 31. 
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1.  Rule Creation 
 
The private community literature worries that in writing private rules, 
subdivision developers provide too few rule options to homeowners and include 
too many servitudes within subdivision declarations.129 It appears, however, that 
landlords may be just as likely to provide inadequate rule variety and too many 
rules, which may be uniform across many rental apartment options. 
The techniques for writing rules in rented and owned private communities do 
differ, however, and these may enhance certain concerns in the ownership context. 
Landlords write lease rules independently; they typically are constrained only by 
public law that provides minimal tenant protections with respect to housing 
conditions and prohibits discriminatory treatment.130 These rules are temporary and 
therefore somewhat low risk, thus offering options for experimentation: the 
landlord can change them in a year or two when the lease expires. If the tenants 
want new rules or fewer of them (if they overwhelmingly argue that parties after 
midnight should be banned, for example, but restrictions on balcony flowerpots 
and chairs should be removed), the landlord may be willing to compromise. 
Further, the landlord contracts individually with tenants in a lease, thus perhaps 
better catering to each community member’s preferences and offering more  
rule variety. 
Developers of common interest communities, on the other hand, write and 
record more permanent rules131 with an accordingly higher cost of failure, and they 
involve more parties in the rule-writing process. Indeed, the developer typically 
consults extensively with attorneys and sometimes with potential buyers during the 
rule writing process.132 These rules, comprised of a set of servitudes, are not 
negotiated individually with each owner of the community; rather, they attach to 
and run with the land. The developer, concerned about selling homes and ensuring 
long-term property values, implements one uniform set of rules, thus offering no 
rule variety among properties within one subdivision; further, the developer often 
uses the same rules in all of her subdivisions.133 She also will likely include more 
                                                 
129 See, e.g., Carmella, supra note 6, at 66 (expressing concern that “residents of CICs 
are often subject to numerous detailed controls,” many of which are standardized); Fennell, 
supra note 13, at 850–53 (noting that uniform rules are not unique to subdivisions, but 
expressing concerns about inadequate rule experimentation and too many rules); Franzese 
& Siegel, supra note 3, at 1126 (worrying about the prospective homebuyer’s inability to 
negotiate rules). 
130 See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(c) (2006). 
131 URBAN LAND INST., supra note 47, at 198 (1964); Fennell, supra note 13, at 838. 
132 See Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 57, at 652. 
133 See Fennell, supra note 13, at 868 n.156, 875 (describing the use of boilerplate 
language and suggesting that developers might use it in order to save money); Winokur, 
supra note 119, at 4 (noting increasing use of servitudes); Wiseman, supra note 3, at  
740 n.280. 
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rules than are desired to cater to the early, risk-averse owners who want to ensure 
that no one will paint their house purple or put plastic flamingos in the yard.134 
Landlords’ and developers’ rule-creation processes and purposes intersect in 
several important ways, however, and create similar concerns (or benefits). 
Developers, like landlords, operate above a public law baseline. Under Shelley v. 
Kraemer, for example, developers may not write and record certain discriminatory 
covenants135 (and landlords likely may not include discriminatory lease provisions, 
as these, too would require enforcement by the courts); both landlords and 
developers are also subject to the Fair Housing Act.136 As rule writers, developers 
and landlords also have similar incentives. Both want to fill the “units” within a 
community—whether they are single-family lots or one-room apartments—and to 
maintain the units’ value; they write rules aimed at these goals, and this likely will 
affect the variety and quantity of rules offered.137 The landlord, who is centrally 
focused on long-term value, controls uses of units that may negatively impact 
tenants’ enjoyment of apartments and thus prevent full occupancy, as well as those 
that will damage the property.138 This may lead to uniform rules across units, thus 
subjecting unit occupants to the same constrained choices criticized in 
subdivisions. 
Perhaps more importantly, developers and landlords, who are both private 
writers of rules, often rely on templates. Landlords may follow the standardized 
lease form written by the state or local realtors’ association,139 and subdivision 
developers frequently rely on boilerplate language.140 This limits the ability of both 
tenants and homeowners, as community consumers, to “vote” for or reject 
particular rules by refusing to sign; if they find the same set of rules in the 
competing apartment building or subdivision, their choices will be limited to 
questions of design and location. Although landlords may potentially negotiate 
                                                 
134 See Fennell, supra note 13, at 869 (“Because the earliest residents bear the greatest 
risk—unlike later residents, they cannot reassure themselves about a community by 
scanning the completed neighborhood—they are likely to desire a high level of protection 
against uncertainty in the form of restrictive servitudes.”). 
135 334 U.S. 1, 12 (1948). 
136 See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(c) (2006). 
137 See Gillette, supra note 13, at 1429–30 (explaining that the developer does not 
cede control to the POA until a certain percentage of homes are sold and “[t]he developer 
desires to market homes within the association, and compliance with the covenants, by 
defining the nature of the community, serves as a marketing tool to attract residents whose 
interests are reflected in those covenants. Hence, one would imagine that market-based 
incentives would induce the developer to interpret the covenants in a manner consistent 
with the norms of the community.”). 
138 See, e.g., Micelli & Sirmans, supra note 111, at 1–2 (describing landlords’ 
incentives to avoid vacancy). 
139 See, e.g., Residential Lease Contract (June 17, 2007) (prepared from form contract 
provided by Texas Apartment Association and Austin Apartment Association) (on file  
with author). 
140 See Fennell, supra note 13, at 868 n.156 (citing to several sources that confirm the 
use of boilerplate language); Winokur, supra note 13, at 98–99. 
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individually with unit occupants for rule modification, this assumes that the 
landlord is willing to bargain—an assumption that several courts have rejected.141 
 
2.  Rule Enforcement 
 
Just as private community scholars worry about the content of the rules 
created by subdivision developers, they also often criticize the private mechanisms 
for enforcing these rules. Professors Paula Franzese and Steven Siegel, for 
example, are concerned that “[f]ew checks are in place to protect from autocratic, 
petty or misguided rule.”142 Professor Franzese further notes problems associated 
with the “zealous homeowners’ associations” that act as the “nice police” within 
subdivisions.143 The overzealous and even vindictive enforcement of rules by 
landlords, however, receives little attention in the private community context 
despite media and scholarly accounts of evictions after tenants complained of poor 
conditions or formed tenants’ associations.144 
The enforcement mechanisms in the two private communities do vary, but 
these differences suggest that we should perhaps be more concerned about 
enforcement of private rules in the rental context than in the ownership context—
or at least that we should explore this possibility. Landlords may implement 
decisions about property use quickly and unilaterally, while POAs (once the 
developer cedes control) must, at least in some cases, take time to vote and agree 
                                                 
141 See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 
139, 170 n.130 (2005) (explaining that “[c]ourts often hold . . . that tenants have no 
bargaining power in dealing with prospective landlords and must meekly accept whatever 
terms the landlord seeks to impose through standard form lease contracts” and citing to 
several cases). 
142 Franzese & Siegel, supra note 3, at 1135. 
143 Franzese, supra note 6, at 338; see also Franzese & Siegel, supra note 3, at 1130 
(explaining that boards may use rules and rule enforcement as “weapons”); Wiseman, 
supra note 3, at 738 n.270 (describing one homeowner’s complaint about alleged 
retaliatory enforcement by a board). 
144 See, e.g., Brian Glick & Matthew J. Rossman, Neighborhood Legal Services as 
House Counsel to Community-Based Efforts to Achieve Economic Justice, 23 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 105, 149–50 (1997) (describing historic landlord retaliation through 
eviction after tenants formed an association or complained of conditions); Jamie Larson, 
Landlord Evicts Outspoken Tenant, REGISTER-STAR (July 27, 2011, 1:00 AM), 
http://www.registerstar.com/articles/2011/07/27/news/doc4e2f95ed331b6815799869.txt 
(describing an eviction following a conditions complaint). These evictions can, of course, 
be challenged in court under both the Constitution and public eviction standards—which do 
not allow eviction in retaliation for speech. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 223-b 
(McKinney 2006) (prohibiting landlord retaliation for, among other acts, the formation of 
tenants’ organizations). Homeowners challenging POA enforcement will face a difficult 
business judgment rule or a more deferential standard of review. See, e.g., Lori A. Roberts, 
Topping Palm Trees in the Name of CC&R Enforcement, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 413,  
423 (2009). 
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on rule enforcement decisions.145 The moderating votes of certain association 
members could protect homeowners against vindictive or arbitrary enforcement, 
while tenants lack a second voice that could force the landlord to take more 
reasonable enforcement action. 
Relatedly, landlords do not operate under private rules that narrow their 
enforcement discretion, although they must follow state-mandated eviction 
procedures146 and certain other public law constraints.147 POAs, in contrast, must 
comply with a complex set of private bylaws governing how they must reach 
enforcement decisions. Bylaws often require public meetings, for example, set the 
percentage of votes required (if any) to amend rules, and describe proper 
procedures for notifying homeowners of violations.148 Limited public  
law requirements constraining association procedures also apply in some  
states.149 Tenants therefore may face a higher danger of unfair enforcement than  
do homeowners. 
Private community scholars could argue that public law constraints on 
landlord enforcement adequately protect tenants and that similar protections are 
lacking in the ownership context. For example, Hawaii requires that lease terms 
and conditions must apply “to all tenants of the property in a fair manner” if they 
are to be enforced, but offers no such protection in the ownership context.150 This 
disparity may be true, but if so, it must be empirically explored. 
 
B.  Homeowners’ and Tenants’ Different Property Interests 
 
Private community scholars are not only concerned about the creation of 
problematic rules or unjust rule enforcement; they also dislike the substance of 
private subdivision rules.151 The Third Restatement, for example, would eliminate 
                                                 
145 See Franzese, supra note 13, at 588 (“[T]he system is set up to require dealings 
with . . . the board of directors or homeowners' association—who in turn enforce a formal 
code . . . .”).  In some cases, however, one or several POA members make unilateral 
decisions to, for example, deny a homeowner’s request to modify an exterior feature, or 
send a letter demanding that a homeowner repair a property feature or cease a  
particular activity. 
146 Self-help eviction is prohibited in a majority of states. See Schissler, supra note 83, 
at 328 (“[A] minority of states still allow landlords to employ self-help—the use of all 
necessary and reasonable force—to evict a tenant.”). 
147 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-52(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2006) (providing that 
a lease obligation or restraint shall not be enforceable against a tenant unless “[i]t applies to 
all tenants of the property in a fair manner”). 
148 URBAN LAND INST., supra note 47, at 397–402 (model bylaws). 
149 See supra note 31 (citing various state requirements such as annual meetings and 
ten days’ notice of the meeting). 
150 See Franzese, supra note 13, at 556 (describing the nearly unlimited discretion of a 
POA board to impose penalties); Reichman, supra note 14, at 269 (describing the 
“unlimited discretion” of most modern architectural review committees in subdivisions). 
151 See infra Part III. 
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servitudes that address “design, materials, colors, or plants that may be used,”152 
because although these restrictions “may contribute to the maintenance of property 
values,” “they are not necessary to the effective functioning of the community.”153 
But if a landlord may impose these types of rules on renters, thus preserving unit 
values and preventing occupants from, say, enduring neighbors’ garish outdoor 
decorations, why may property owners not collectively restrain their property uses 
to achieve similar goals? 
The occupants of rented and owned living spaces do, of course, have 
strikingly different interests in the properties,154 and these interests may influence 
the types of rules that are acceptable in one community but not the other. Tenants 
are generally unconcerned about the value of the unit and particularly the long-
term value, aside from the risk of losing a security deposit, being sued, or living in 
unpleasant conditions.155 Homeowners, on the other hand, are centrally concerned 
about property value.156 But an investigation of private governments’ incentives—
those of landlords, developers, and POAs—reveals that the purposes of the use 
limiting rules are quite similar. 
 
1.  Preferences for Different Types of Value-Preserving Rules 
 
A home’s value plays a central role in property owner decision making, and a 
POA is focused on protecting two types of property values: the individual 
homeowner’s daily enjoyment of her property and her long-term property value, 
which the value of the community as a whole affects. Although the owner can 
                                                 
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.9 (2000). 
153 Id. cmt. a. 
154 This Article uses the term “value interest” rather than “financial interest” to 
capture the many elements of a property user’s interest. 
155 See, e.g., Kathryn Hake, Is Home Where Arkansas’s Heart Is?: State Adopts 
Unique Statutory Approach to Landlord Tort Liability and Maintains Common Law 
“Caveat Lessee,” 59 ARK. L. REV. 737, 742 (2006) (“Even a handy tenant has no incentive 
to conduct maintenance and repairs because he has . . . no incentive to increase the value of 
the property for his landlord’s benefit.”). 
156 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES 
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 
9 (2001) (arguing that homeowners’ votes in local governance are primarily shaped by 
concerns about property value). Although this Part focuses on the property value interest, 
homeowners and renters have important goals for property that move far beyond financial 
value, as the human flourishing literature has emphasized primarily in the ownership 
context. See, e.g., Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 822–24 
(2009) (arguing for a more careful exploration of the land-use model that assumes a 
“‘rational’ landowner motivated primarily by a desire to maximize her wealth” (citation 
omitted)). Both homeowners and renters use property to fulfill their emotional and social 
needs, for example, which the human flourishing literature would, at minimum, include 
within utility-based measures. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 22, at 766–73 (describing 
community-based connections). 
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control her own activities and thus, to some extent, the value of her home,157 she 
relies on the rules to control neighbors’ uses that spill over to her property—uses 
that are best understood as “neighbor externalities.” To reduce these externalities, 
the rules governing a subdivision regulate many exterior uses,158 even temporary 
ones, because they have strong spillover effects. These rules may also regulate 
interior uses of the home, both temporary and permanent, that are sufficiently 
powerful to impact neighbors.159 Because homeowners individually care about the 
long-term value of their home, however, there is less incentive to regulate interior 
uses that lack noticeable externalities. 
The landlord of a multiunit apartment, like the POA in a subdivision, focuses 
on tenants’ daily enjoyment of property because she wants to maximize value, in 
this case by filling the most units at the highest possible rent over the long term. 
Unhappy tenants may move out or refuse to rent at the outset.160 The landlord also 
aims to preserve the long-term property value of the structures that she owns. To 
do this, she will write the same types of externality-limiting rules found in a 
private subdivision: she will focus most closely on regulating permanent exterior 
uses of units (modifications to balconies and doors, for example) and interior uses 
with spillover effects. The fundamental difference between rental and ownership, 
however, lies in the landlord’s need to preserve long-term value. 
The landlord, who must protect an investment while ceding control of the 
property to an individual with different incentives, must somehow ensure that her 
tenant will not unduly damage the property. This value interest supports unique 
lease rules that prevent damage to the structure of the property, including the 
interior. POAs also may implement some regulations that prohibit substantial 
interior damage, though, for fear that poor landowner decisions about interior 
uses—a remodeling job that converts a home to a sports bar decor, for example—
will lower property values. 
On the whole, the difference between value considerations in rented and 
owned communities, although fundamental, probably results in relatively few 
categorical differences in the rule sets of the two communities. Rules restricting 
individuals’ uses of property are imposed to protect short-term enjoyment and 
long-term property values, both of individual units or homes and of the community 
as a whole. 
 
                                                 
157 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) (noting that “individual 
residents themselves have strong incentives to keep their own property values up and to 
prevent ‘visual clutter’ in their own yards and neighborhoods . . . .”). 
158 See Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 57, at 611–12 (explaining that POAs’ “power 
is generally used to regulate conduct on the exterior portions of private property that might 
be visible from other private or common property or that might result in unreasonable 
annoyances to persons beyond the boundaries of the private property”). 
159 See, e.g., Franzese, supra note 6, at 339–40 (describing covenants affecting  
the interior). 
160 See generally Micelli & Sirmans, supra note 111 (explaining that tenants unhappy 
with maintenance may vacate). 
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2.  Direct and Indirect Representation of Individuals’ Property Value Preferences 
 
A second value difference in rented and owned communities arises from 
distinctions in the rule enforcement process. Landlords and POAs, as small 
“governments” that implement rules to preserve property values, represent this 
interest in different ways. The landlord writes and enforces her own rules, thus 
directly capturing her desire to maximize property value and reduce use conflicts 
among neighboring units. POAs, in contrast, bring considerations other than 
property value into their rule enforcement decisions. Although the members of the 
association want to maintain the value, some members also may want to give 
neighbors special enforcement favors.161 They also might use their position of 
power to break the rules themselves.162 Certain procedural constraints on  
POAs therefore may be necessary to dampen these illegitimate incentives for  
rule enforcement. 
From the perspective of ensuring that rule enforcement adequately 
encapsulates the landlord’s property value concerns, landlords typically do not 
need these types of enforcement checks. As discussed in Part II.A.1, however, 
tenants need procedural constraints on enforcement for other reasons, such as 
ensuring that rule enforcement by the landlord is not arbitrary or vindictive. 
Considered together, private community rules and their enforcement all aim to 
maintain individual unit or home values and, more importantly, collective values 
of the community as a whole. Even in owned communities, POAs may not trust 
the homeowners to adequately maintain this collective value, as individual 
preferences could trump the collective, long-term good. Landlords, too, are 
concerned that tenants will not maintain either individual unit value or the value of 
the apartment complex as a whole. And finally, both POAs and landlords may 
zealously enforce rules to effectuate their value preserving purposes, although 
POAs may require more direction in this area to ensure that enforcement is not 
conducted for purposes unrelated to this goal. 
 
C.  Space 
 
In addition to voicing concerns about rule writing, enforcement, and 
substance, the literature has (legitimately) focused on the physical effects of 
private subdivisions, namely the walling off of thousands of residents through the 
creation of gated communities.163 Despite decrying the negative societal effects of 
physical walls, the literature immediately turns to the individual homeowner within 
this gated community, worrying that the homeowner’s own castle is inadequately 
                                                 
161 See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 3, at 738 n. 270 (describing homeowners’ claims 
that POAs enforced rules vindictively and arbitrarily). 
162 See id. 
163 See infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
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protected from intrusive rules.164 This special treatment of owned homes within 
subdivisions likely arises in part from assumptions about space: that residents of 
single-family homes on separate lots are entitled to exclusive use of property, 
while renters of units, although technically holding the same exclusive possessory 
right, are not. 
If the literature were to more closely investigate this assumption, it would be 
correct to note that when units within a private community are closer together, 
more types of property uses will have substantial spillover effects. Rules that 
reduce neighbors’ conflicts through strict constraints on property use may therefore 
find more purchase in apartments, where units are closer together, than in private 
subdivisions of single-family homes. On the other hand, single-family homes have 
more spillover effects beyond the borders of the private community.165 This may 
justify strict regulation of certain uses in private subdivisions to mitigate these 
societal externalities. 
 
1.  The Size of Property and its Proximity to Other Structures 
 
One way of envisioning spatial differences, which may affect rule 
expectations, is to locate a property’s “zone of exclusion.” This zone is analogous 
to curtilage in the Fourth Amendment context, but it is more broadly defined here 
as the space surrounding the walls of a unit or home; within this space, the tenant 
or owner may claim exclusive use rights. The size of the zone of exclusion 
strongly influences the spillover effects of property uses. Someone who occupies a 
single-family property with a large zone of exclusion likely has different 
expectations for her use of property than does a tenant in a high-rise apartment. 
Based on these expectations, the literature’s assessment of private rules—and our 
laws’ reactions to them—therefore may reasonably vary. A larger zone of 
exclusion might include a hedge that shields the homeowner’s view of ugly 
neighboring structures and blocks noise, for example. Even a homeowner in a 
private subdivision with hundreds of neighboring lots therefore may not expect 
many rules limiting her and her neighbors’ uses. Indeed, this owner already has 
several common law and constitutional protections against annoyances, and she 
may not need the help of private rules. She may exclude trespassers both from the 
walls of her home and from her property boundaries, and she may sue for nuisance 
if neighbors generate smoke, noise, or other intrusions that interfere with her use of 
the yard.166 Finally, under the Fourth Amendment, the government may not enter 
the curtilage of a home except with a warrant.167 
                                                 
164 See, e.g., Franzese, supra note 6, at 338–41 (criticizing the “regimentation” of 
rules that govern everything from the neatness of homes’ interiors to pet weights and 
garage door closure). 
165 See infra text accompanying notes 171–172. 
166 See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil, 77 S.E.2d 682, 688, 690 (N.C. 1953) (holding 
that oil company operations may constitute a private nuisance whether operated negligently 
or not). 
167 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987). 
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A renter of a unit within a multiunit complex, in contrast, has a smaller zone 
of exclusion and perhaps anticipates more private rules that will uniformly 
constrain her and her neighbors’ uses. Take a hypothetical owner or renter of Unit 
A in a multiunit building abutted by a common hallway to the front, other units to 
both sides, and a sidewalk and businesses behind the unit. Police and the public 
may walk down the hall directly outside of her unit. Other property users will be 
close by and, in pursuing normal activities—running dishwashers or televisions, 
for example—will be heard through shared walls. 
Despite these external annoyances, within the walls of her unit, the owner still 
enjoys exclusion powers, including the ability to keep out unwanted individuals 
through common law trespass. In many states, she also may sue for nuisance.168 
Like a homeowner, the tenant has rights against government officials acting 
without a warrant;169 a smaller curtilage simply shrinks this zone to a smaller area, 
and with it, expectations for privacy.170 
In sum, for multiunit apartment buildings, which provide individuals with 
fewer physical and legal opportunities to exclude various annoyances, private rules 
strictly limiting the use of stereos, decorations on windows, visitor hours, and even 
interior wall colors may be expected and may therefore seem reasonable. In private 
subdivisions, expectations for detailed rules likely will differ depending on the 
proximity of the units. 
 
2.  The Environmental and Social Effects of Single and Multiunit Structures 
 
Although owners of single-family homes on large lots in a private subdivision 
may not need many private rules to keep out neighbor externalities, these owners 
should perhaps anticipate another sort of rule. Single-family homes have more 
impacts outside of the community than do multiunit structures, and this may justify 
more limitations on activities with effects that drift beyond subdivision boundaries. 
Considered individually, single-family homes are less efficient than multiunit 
structures.171 They take up more space due to the lack of shared walls, prevent 
                                                 
168 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821E cmt. c (1977) (providing that creators 
of nuisances will be liable to all “possessors of the land,” and including renters in this 
category). But see Kent v. Humphries, 281 S.E.2d 43, 45–46 (N.C. 1981) (finding that a 
tenant at will has an insufficient interest in property to win a nuisance claim). 
169 Even the occupant of a hotel room maintains this right to exclude. See Stoner v. 
California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964); see also Greg Knopp et al., Warrantless Searches 
and Seizures, 83 GEO. L.J. 692, 737 n. 263 (1995) (comparing motel warrant cases). 
170 See Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the government 
claimed that it could enter the backyard of one unit of a four-unit complex without a 
warrant because of the multiunit nature of the complex. However, the court determined that 
“[w]hile the enjoyment of [the petitioner’s] backyard [was] not as exclusive as the 
backyard of a purely private residence,” the yard was “not as public or shared as the 
corridors, yards or other common areas of a large apartment complex or motel.” Id. at 484. 
171 See, e.g., MARILYN A. BROWN ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., SHRINKING THE CARBON 
FOOTPRINT OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA 11–12 (2008), available at 
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occupants from sharing infrastructure like heating units and laundry facilities, and 
often have water-intensive lawns.172 This apartment-subdivision difference, 
although important, is somewhat limited. First, both multiunit structures and 
subdivisions have strong environmental effects, although they differ in magnitude. 
One notable inefficiency in multiunit buildings, for example, arises when landlords 
charge a uniform per-unit fee for all services, including electricity and water.173 
Because all occupants pay the same fee, they have little incentive to curtail their 
own resource use. 
Another difference between rented multi-unit apartments and private 
subdivisions is starker, however. Many private subdivisions, in addition to 
generating environmental effects, have important social externalities in their 
creation of exclusive zones of luxury, some of which arise from the subdivisions’ 
physical layout or rules,174 as further described in Part III. Apartments, too, 
increasingly offer gated and luxury amenities.175 But gated apartments—which are 
                                                 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/5/carbon%20footprint%20s
arzynski/carbonfootprint_report.pdf (explaining that units with shared walls have lower 
carbon emissions); Ellie Carroll, Twenty-Five Years in the Making: Why Sustainable 
Development Has Eluded the U.N. and How Community-Driven Development Offers the 
Solution, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 545, 568–69 (2010) (describing how ecovillages often use 
shared structures to improve efficiency). 
172 Cf. Dyckman, supra note 112, at 36 (explaining that of three POAs investigated in 
California, “only one of the three would replant with a lower water-consuming palate” 
despite “concern for the high water cost associated with common area landscaping”); 
Benjamin Wermund, Without Water Restrictions, Hutto Neighborhoods Nag About Lawn 
Care, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN (Sept. 26, 2011, 9:01 PM), http://www.statesman.com/ 
news/local/without-water-restrictions-hutto-neighborhoods-nag-about-lawn-1879184.html 
(explaining that a subdivision in Texas asked homeowners to continue watering their lawns 
despite a severe drought). 
173 See Frederick R. Fucci et al., Alternative Energy Options for Buildings: 
Distributed Generation, in GREEN REAL ESTATE SUMMIT 2010, at 337, 347 (PLI Real 
Estate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 386, 2010) (explaining that “most 
multi-family buildings still do not have submeters” and that “if a multi-unit building is 
submetered, this alone will save a significant amount of electricity, once a resident makes a 
direct correlation between his or her own usage and the cost of power”). 
174 Cf. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 76, at 2–3 (estimating that more than three 
million Americans lived in gated communities in 1999); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SERIES 
H150/07, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2007, at 66 (2008), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/h150-07.pdf (indicating that in 2007, 
Americans lived in 10,393,000 housing units with “[c]ommunity access secured with walls 
or fences”). Not all of these communities are necessarily private subdivisions. 
175 See, e.g., Vivian S. Toy, Vertigo in the Markets: Rent, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, 
at RE1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/realestate/for-rentals-no-ceiling-
in-sight.html (describing the rise of the luxury rental and noting that “[h]ardwood floors 
have replaced the long-ubiquitous parquet, and washers and dryers in apartments have 
become de rigueur”); RICHDALE APARTMENTS, http://www.richdale.com/houston/ (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2012) (describing luxury gated apartment complexes in Houston); Austin 
Apartments, TRIANGLE, http://www.triangleaustin.com/Austin-TX-apartments.asp (last 
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even more prevalent than gated owned communities—are often low-income 
rentals,176 suggesting the gates have a very different purpose. 
The spatial differences between multiunit apartment buildings and 
subdivisions of single-family homes are meaningful, but they do not suggest that 
rules within rented and owned communities serve wholly different purposes. 
Namely, provisions in leases and servitudes attached to deeds centrally aim to 
reduce the conflicts of neighboring property uses. The closer the units, the more 
likely the conflict, but this is all a matter of degree. A barking dog in the yard of a 
single-family home may be just as irksome as a TV blaring behind the wall of an 
apartment unit. Considered more broadly, the spatial differences between single-
family homes and multiunit apartments, such as the tendency for owned 
subdivisions to be exclusive and more environmentally damaging, may potentially 
demand external rules that trump or weaken certain private rules. As discussed 
here, however, as more people flock to rentals, luxury apartment buildings with 
fancy amenities and exclusive tendencies may increasingly sway governments to 
similarly intrude upon private rental rules. 
 
D.  Duration of Property Use 
 
An additional, often-cited divide between tenants and property owners is the 
length of their stay.177 The literature tends to assume that tenants are highly mobile 
and care little about the long-term vitality of their community, while property 
owners are fixtures within their neighborhoods.178 This creates two distinctions 
between rented and owned private communities—exit options and the formation of 
                                                 
visited Oct. 29, 2012) (advertising “an onsite cardio workout facility and a resort style 
pool” as well as “courtyard views, private garages or attached garages”); Luxury 
Apartments, APARTMENT GUIDE, http://www.apartmentguide.com/luxury-apartments-for-
rent/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2012) (listing luxury apartments in sixteen major cities); Welcome 
Home, Luxury Apartments & Town Homes Located in Suburban Buffalo, NY, BMW 
MGMT. CO., http://www.luxuryaptswny.com/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2012); The Seneca, 
CAMPUS APARTMENTS, http://www.campusapts.com/seneca/ (describing a luxury 
apartment complex near Ohio State University) (last visited Oct. 4, 2012). 
176 Cf. Thomas W. Sanchez et al., Security Versus Status? A First Look at the 
Census’s Gated Community Data, 24 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 281, 281 (2005) (concluding 
from the 2001 census that “low-income renters are actually more likely to live in walled or 
gated communities compared to affluent homeowners”). 
177 See, e.g., Stern, supra note 103, at 914 (explaining how homeownership, which 
prompts “longer residence duration” also “affects social contribution”). 
178 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 143, 149–50 (2010) (observing that communities “worry that tenants will do 
less than homeowners to keep up their homes and contribute to the community” because 
“[m]ost tenants have little financial stake in their own housing units,” although noting that 
causation is difficult to establish). 
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norms179—that could potentially justify different treatment of rules and governance 
structures in each community. 
 
1.  Exit and Voice: Why Mobile Tenants May Have More Options to Escape Rules 
 
Tenants often sign short leases that guarantee them one or two years of 
occupancy.180 Although they have few opportunities to voice their objections to 
lease rules or landlord enforcement of these rules during this short term, they may 
have easier exit options than do landowners; they need not sell an expensive 
investment in order to leave.181 In light of this option, the literature may justifiably 
be more concerned about problematic rules and governance structures in owned 
than in rented communities. 
Although renters have greater ease of exit than do homeowners, after the rule-
creation process, homeowners in private subdivisions may have more voice, which 
could moderate the effects of their constrained exit option. The bylaws in private 
subdivisions often provide for modification of the original covenants, conditions, 
and restrictions.182 The modification is not easy; residents often must muster a 
supermajority vote to change the rules.183 Still, this offers a voice option that most 
tenants lack.184 Owners in subdivisions also can influence rule enforcement by 
participating on the architectural and design review committee, for example, which 
grants or denies owners’ proposals to deviate from the rules. Tenants typically lack 
these types of formal venues to voice concerns about rules in their leases. 
With tenants’ constrained voice options come certain meaningful limitations 
on exit: Some long-term renters185 must stay within one community due to family, 
a job, or other considerations. Even for short-term renters, as Professor Ellickson 
notes, “the out-of-pocket and aggravation costs of moving are not trivial.”186 Some 
laws in the rental context already recognize this, providing special protections for 
the handicapped and elderly when landlords of multiunit buildings propose to 
                                                 
179 For a full and persuasive account of norms that govern neighbors’ interactions, 
such as the repairing of a fence or garden damaged by a neighbor’s cattle, see ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
180 See Stern, supra note 103, at 938. 
181 For the original theory of individuals’ ability to influence governmental actions 
through voice and exit, see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970). 
182 See NELSON, supra note 3 (describing amendment provisions). 
183 See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 46, at 
16 (noting that “some association covenants contain no provision for alteration” and that 
some “require a unanimous vote,” but that “many covenants now substitute supermajorities 
. . . for unanimity”). 
184 Tenants may, on the other hand, be able to renegotiate the lease before signing it 
for a second term. 
185 See Robert C. Ellickson, Rent Control: A Comment on Olsen, 67 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 947, 951 (1991) (describing occasional long-term rent scenarios). 
186 Ellickson, supra note 14, at 1552. 
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convert them to owned condominium complexes.187 Tenants also may lack a 
choice of alternative rules even if they could exit, however. Many cannot afford to 
buy a home or unit,188 and their options for other communities and rules are 
limited—particularly where landlords tend to use uniformly worded leases. 
 
2.  A Lack of Opportunity for Norm Establishment: Why Mobile Residents May 
Need More Rules 
 
Due in part to the higher cost of exit, homeowners tend to stay in one place 
longer; permanent residents, in turn, tend to develop repeat relationships with 
neighbors and establish informal norms that control many neighbor externalities,189 
thus perhaps justifying fewer use-constraining rules in owned communities than in 
rented ones. If Resident A’s property use in a private subdivision annoyed 
neighbors, these neighbors could spread unpleasant rumors in the community or 
express displeasure directly to Resident A. Resident A, knowing that she would 
see her neighbors at next year’s potluck or board meeting or simply meet them on 
the street, would feel informal pressure to conform her uses to neighborhood 
expectations and avoid continued interactions with neighbors who disapproved of 
her property use. 
More temporary residents (typically renters) may experience fewer of these 
informal pressures and may therefore reasonably expect to encounter more formal 
rules that control the external effects of property uses. This duration distinction, 
although relevant, does not apply to the many long-term renters who have deep ties 
with their neighbors.190 Further, even short-term renters are incentivized to avoid 
                                                 
187 See, e.g., Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act, D.C. CODE § 42-3404.02 (2011) 
(requiring any “owner of a housing accommodation” to “give the tenant an opportunity to 
purchase”); Bernard V. Keenan, Condominium Conversion of Residential Rental Units: A 
Proposal for State Regulation and a Model Act, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 712–13 
(1987) (explaining that conversion laws tend to protect low-income, disabled, and elderly 
residents, although the elderly are the most commonly protected group); Kathryn B. 
Richards, The Illinois Condominium Property Act: An Analysis of Legislative Efforts to 
Improve Tenants’ Rights in the Condominium Conversion Process, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 
829, 836 n.50 (2008) (listing acts that protect the elderly and disabled when condominium 
conversion is proposed). 
188 See A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Homeownership and Why Home 
Ownership Is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 207 (2009) (explaining that 
“many lower- and middle-income homeowners simply cannot afford to buy homes unless 
they accept risky, complex mortgage products that force them to gamble that the return  
on their investment . . . will be large enough to ‘cover’ the high cost of their 
investments . . . .”). 
189 See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 179 (describing how in many public 
communities, neighbors develop their own, complex informal laws to, for example, govern 
damage to property by cattle). 
190 See Ellickson, supra note 14, at 1551–52 (noting that “a settled tenant is likely to 
have sentimental ties with neighborhood people and places”). 
2106 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
 
angering their unit neighbors.191 Indeed, multiunit apartment complexes—which 
often include smaller, more closely packed populations of residents than do 
subdivisions—may offer ideal opportunities for norm creation.192 
The reader who has progressed this far will likely predict the conclusion here, 
as in the subparts above: differences in the duration of a resident’s time within a 
private community matter, but not substantially. Renters’ hypothetical ability to 
exit disliked rules more easily may not be real in light of income and other 
constraints; this cautions against broad assumptions that the literature should 
concern itself only with problematic rules in owned communities, where exit is 
difficult. Further, norm creation likely occurs in both communities, although to 
different degrees, which suggests that certain types of private rules may overreach 
and address problems that norms could better solve. 
 
E.  Tradition 
 
A final difference between rented and owned private communities rests within 
the powerful yet nebulous realm of tradition. Mobile tenants may have different 
expectations for property and property rules simply because these rules have been 
common for so long, and the long tradition of detailed rules in leases may place 
tenants on notice of these rules. Homeowners, in contrast, might not expect certain 
types of rules because of the freedoms traditionally associated with ownership of 
single-family homes: the home is a castle, within which an individual is free to do 
what she pleases, and rules and governance to the contrary are unacceptable. As 
the Third Restatement of Property argues, in proposing that “design controls” are 
unnecessary in a common interest community: 
 
Long tradition supports the individual’s right to determine the aesthetic 
qualities of the home and, within limits imposed by zoning and building 
codes, to construct structures that suit his or her tastes and needs. 
Purchasers in communities without design controls may have a reliance 
interest in the absence of such controls that should be protected.193 
 
Tradition appears to be the core pillar supporting many private community 
scholars’ handwringing about the effects of private governments on the occupants 
of castles. Unfortunately, it is also the weakest pillar unless we can show that 
homeowners who still view the home as a castle free of detailed rules were 
                                                 
191 See Kathryn Hendley, Resolving Problems Among Neighbors in Post-Soviet 
Russia: Uncovering the Norms of the Pod”ezd, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 388, 402–06 (2011) 
(explaining that the majority of unit dwellers preferred self-help in solving disputes, such 
as talking with neighbors). 
192 See, e.g., Paul E. McGreal, Social Capital in Constitutional Law: The Case of 
Religious Norm Enforcement Through Prayer at Public Occasions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 585, 
602–03 (2008) (describing a “handful of neighbors living in a small apartment complex or 
dormitory, where neighbors can monitor neighborhood norms in a less costly fashion”). 
193 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.9 cmt. a (2000). 
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legitimately unaware of rules that they committed to when buying—a possibility 
discussed in Part III. It is true that homeowners in America have, historically, 
enjoyed a freedom from rules that severely restrict individual property uses, and 
that tenants have long faced detailed lists of rules.194 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has looked to tradition in prohibiting a public government from banning signs in 
residential yards, concluding that “[a] special respect for individual liberty in the 
home has long been part of our culture and our law,” particularly a respect for the 
ability to “speak” from the home, and that “[m]ost Americans would be 
understandably dismayed, given that tradition, to learn that it was illegal to display 
from their window an 8- by 11-inch sign expressing their political views.”195 
As we have seen, however, homeowners increasingly encounter detailed rules 
in private subdivisions; over the past few decades, common interest communities 
with complex sets of servitudes have grown astronomically.196 With the rising 
prevalence of subdivisions, the tradition of freedom from rules is fast fading. 
Although private subdivisions are more common in certain states than in others—
representing the majority of new home development in states like California, 
Texas, and Florida before the real estate crash197—at least one private subdivision 
with a long list of rules exists in every state.198 The tradition of rules in rented 
communities is indeed a longer one, but owned communities are quickly catching 
up, thus weakening the tradition distinction. 
Looking beyond tradition to other differences between rented and owned 
communities, there are some justifications for separating renters from owners, but 
still not enough to divide these communities into two spheres within normative 
discussions about private governance. Homeowners tend to live in larger spaces 
with yards or fences separating properties, they typically live in these spaces for a 
longer time than do tenants in apartment buildings, and they have a much greater 
value interest—particularly in their individual property—than do renters. They also 
may have a more difficult time exiting their community, and therefore may find it 
difficult to avoid problematic rules. But these generalizations are not always true, 
and the differences are a matter of degree. Where critiques of private rules cannot 
locate a relevant difference between owners and renters to support its wholesale 
                                                 
194 Fennell, supra note 15, at 1056 (noting that “renters often face rather severe 
constraints on their autonomy with regard to matters such as pet keeping, decorating, and 
landscaping” and concluding that despite rising restraints on autonomy in common interest 
communities, homeowners typically have more freedom of use). 
195 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994). 
196 Common interest communities existed prior to the 1960s, but between the ’60s and 
’70s they grew substantially and have since expanded at an increasingly rapid rate, 
ballooning to nearly 300,800 in 2008. See Wiseman, supra note 3, at 711 (citing Industry 
Data, supra note 3). 
197 MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 11–12 (explaining that almost all new development in 
these states is within private communities). 
198 See Ross-Harrington, supra note 23, at 212 (“The fifty states, the District of 
Columbia, and Puerto Rico all have enacted legislation designed to govern the 
establishment, management, and dissolution of common-interest communities.”). 
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omission of tenants, those critiques must be revisited, and Part III takes up  
this task. 
 
III.  EVALUATING PRIVATE COMMUNITY CRITIQUES AND THEIR FAILURE TO RELY 
ON LEGITIMATE RENTAL-OWNER DIFFERENCES 
 
This Part analyzes the specific critiques of private communities in the private 
community literature in light of the differences identified in Part II, explaining why 
rentals should play a central role in each of these critiques. Exploring potentially 
legitimate justifications for varied rental-owner treatment, this Part shows that the 
nearly universal view of renters as lowly tenement inhabitants unworthy of legal 
concern must cede to a more inclusive analysis. First, it explores the general tenor 
of the critiques, which tend to focus on whether private-community residents 
voluntarily consent to rules or are unknowingly bound. This should affect both 
renters’ and homeowners’ level of comfort with the private rules, at least with 
respect to how they influence the daily lives of those subject to the rules. Second, 
this Part addresses critiques that apply to the internal working of private 
communities and their rules, including whether residents—both renters and 
owners—have adequate notice of the private rules; whether developers of private 
communities offer adequate options among rule sets and respond to consumer 
signals; whether residents have opportunities to modify rules that they dislike; 
whether residents can ensure fair and nondiscriminatory enforcement of rules; and 
whether, independent of residents’ voluntary acceptance of the rules, they are 
somehow substantively problematic. Finally, this Part explores normative 
assessments of private communities’ external impacts, suggesting how we might 
favor or oppose private rules—in both rented and owned communities—based on 
their environmental and social effects outside of the communities. 
 
A.  Introducing the Existing Critiques 
 
Normative analyses of private communities must be understood in the context 
of the property governance systems that create them, which are largely 
contractual.199 Under the consent theory of private communities, a resident 
commits to private governance by purchasing property to which servitudes attach 
and, in so doing, contracts into the rules.200 A resident who dislikes the covenants, 
conditions, and restrictions in a particular private community can choose not to 
                                                 
199 A resident’s purchase of property and an accompanying deed containing servitudes 
or signature on a lease is, under one view of property, not in fact “contractual” but has 
many contract-like elements. Cf. Lee Hargrave, Public Records & Property Rights, 56 LA. 
L. REV. 535, 543 (1996) (“Unlike the common law, which treats leasehold interests as 
property rights or real rights, the civil law majority view has been that a lease is a contract 
that produces only personal rights and obligations.”). 
200 Natelson, supra note 56, at 54 (1990) (describing the “consent theory”); id. at 42 
n.4 (listing the “consent” theorists as including Robert Ellickson, Richard Epstein, and 
Uriel Reichman). 
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purchase in the community and to remain in a public neighborhood instead, or to 
find a property in an alternative private community with different rules. 
Objections to the consent theory of private communities arise on several 
different fronts. Some focus on their societal effects, arguing that even if 
consumers have consented to joining these communities, we must consider the 
externalities generated by millions of individuals contracting for exclusive private 
living.201 Others challenge the core assumptions of the theory, arguing that 
consumers do not truly consent because they fail to fully understand or internalize 
the effects of property rules when purchasing property in a private community.202 
Still others—again disagreeing with the premises of the theory—argue that private 
communities may systematically fail to reflect consumers’ true preferences 
because of imperfect information signals running from them to developers, and 
other market-based problems.203 Substantively, scholars are also bothered by the 
content of the rules, worrying that regardless of how or why the rules came about 
(including by consumer choice), they intrude into traditional core areas of property 
use and improperly limit freedom of use that individuals expect to accompany 
property ownership.204 
The private community scholarship has developed a rich account of the 
benefits and pitfalls of property systems formed by private contracts,205 but it has 
focused nearly exclusively on private subdivisions. In so doing, it has failed to 
acknowledge the “other” private communities—the rental properties outside  
of private subdivisions that are equally as contractual as private  
homeowners’ associations. 
 
B.  Internal Private Community Problems 
 
Consumers contracting to live in spaces governed by POAs or to rent do so 
under a variety of conditions that can make the contract less than voluntary or 
simply a bad deal for the consumer. These conditions arise both at the consumer 
level—where residents “purchase” private communities by moving to them and 
agreeing to their rules—and the producer level—where developers, responding to 
                                                 
201 See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 12; Franzese & Siegel, supra note 3; MCKENZIE, 
supra note 3. 
202 See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 13, at 880–81 (describing consumers’ potential 
inability to fully understand the significance of the rules they are committing to by 
purchasing in a private community). 
203 See, e.g., id. at 855 (describing rules in private communities “that are inefficiently 
restrictive for some individuals with regard to some uses”). 
204 See, e.g., Winokur, supra note 119, at 4–5 (describing private rules’ interference 
with personal liberties); Carmella, supra note 6, at 66 (arguing that rules “can border on the 
absurd, like prohibitions on cracked flowerpots or overweight pets” and that “even 
prohibitions that are reasonable, when considered on an individual basis, can in the 
aggregate create an oppressive servitude regime”). 
205 See supra notes 12–14. 
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signals from consumers and governments, create properties governed by  
private rules. 
 
1.  Consumer Failure: Inadequate Notice and Rule Comprehension 
 
(a)  Homeowners 
 
A detailed literature suggests that some residents purchasing homes in private 
subdivisions are not aware of the rules that attach to their property.206 A visual 
inspection of the property will not alert a buyer to all rules in a thick packet of 
detailed servitudes. At best, she can walk through the subdivision and likely pick 
up hints of rules; a lack of garages visible from the street, for example, may alert 
the buyer to a backyard garage requirement. But all servitudes will not lead to 
visible signs of rules,207 and constructive notice will be incomplete. The buyer also 
may not receive actual notice of the servitudes, particularly in states that do not 
require disclosure of servitudes to prospective buyers prior to closing. 
In many cases, title searches or disclosure rules do alert a buyer to the 
existence of private rules that attach to property,208 and some buyers read these 
rules. Even when servitudes are disclosed or made apparent by visual inspection, 
however, consumers often do not read them in full.209 Worse yet, behavioral 
economics research suggests that, due both to limitations of the human mind and 
of language, even a diligent purchaser who reads and agrees to the rules will not, 
and perhaps cannot, fully comprehend their import.210 
A prospective purchaser may both misunderstand the meaning of a rule in the 
present and struggle to internalize its future import; she also cannot predict all 
potential future applications of the rule. A rule that is generally worded may not 
describe the many activities that it prohibits, and its interpretation by private rule 
enforcers with broad discretion cannot be fully predicted ex ante; a ban on lawn 
ornamentation, for example, may prohibit the planting of flowers in a front yard as 
interpreted by the architectural review board of the POA. The consumer, on the 
other hand, may assume that the rule bans pink flamingos and birdbaths, not 
gardens. Even for a specifically worded rule, the consumer may simply fail to 
internalize its effect if the rule is conveyed without examples of its application or 
                                                 
206 Alexander, Voice in Homeowner Associations, supra note 13, at 156 (concluding, 
from twenty-one interviews, that “[l]ess than 10 percent of the residents interviewed had 
read the rules before closing on the home” in a private community); Winokur, supra note 
13, at 99 (concluding that few residents have knowledge of rules). 
207 See Carol M. Rose, Comment, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments 
on Professors French and Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403, 1405–06 (1982). 
208 See Stewart E. Sterk, Publicly Held Servitudes in the New Restatement, 27 CONN. 
L. REV. 157, 165 (1994) (observing that “properly recorded servitudes will be rediscovered 
through ordinary title searches”). 
209 Wiseman, supra note 3, at 746–47. 
210 See id. at 733 (describing the consumer’s inability or failure to understand  
the rules). 
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even images.211 And if she can visualize the effects of a rule, the owner still cannot 
fully know her future self. Someone who dislikes the aesthetic of solar panels now 
and agrees to a clearly worded covenant prohibiting solar panels may later be 
inspired by a friend who develops a passion for environmental protection; the 
prohibition may then seem burdensome. Finally, prospective purchasers may 
understand a detailed rule—a requirement to pay a $200 fee monthly, for 
example—but miscalculate their ability to comply with it, as demonstrated by 
recent foreclosures in private subdivisions as a result of fee default.212 
If rule modification had low transaction costs, then purchasers’ upfront 
commitment to rules not known or fully comprehended would not be problematic. 
There often are nearly insurmountable barriers to modifying rules contained in 
original common interest community servitudes, however,213 therefore leaving 
residents with only the high-cost option of exit if they dislike rules to which they 
have committed. 
 
(b)  Renters 
 
Homeowners living in private subdivisions are not the only community 
consumers who sometimes lack full knowledge or understanding of rules. Just as 
many homeowners fail to take in long lists of servitudes, many tenants do not read 
leases,214 or at least do not easily understand much of their language.215 Tenants 
                                                 
211 See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 3, at 1126–27 (expressing concerns about the 
wide lack of understanding of rules in private communities); Oren Bar-Gill, The 
Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 761–65 (2008) 
(explaining that “consumers make systematic mistakes in choosing among different credit 
card products” and citing to several factors that may be relevant for private community 
consumers, including, for example, consumers’ underestimation of how much they can 
borrow due to optimism about their “future credit needs” or “future will power”); 
Wiseman, supra note 3, at 733 (citing to Bar-Gill and discussing the difficulty of 
understanding the import of servitudes). 
212 See, e.g., Wade Goodwyn, Not So Neighborly Associations Foreclosing on Homes, 
NAT’L. PUBLIC RADIO (June 29, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=128078864&ps=cprs/ (describing an HOA’s foreclosure on a veteran’s 
home for missing two dues payments). 
213 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
214 See Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 
69 MICH. L. REV. 247, 256 (1970) (describing a survey of 100 “sample” tenants in Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, finding that 57% of tenants had carefully read their first lease with a 
landlord before signing it, but that only 50% read subsequent leases, while only 25% 
carefully read the “typed in” or handwritten lease portions). 
215 See, e.g., Curtis J. Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 
821–22 (1974) (concluding from a survey of “representative” lease forms from sixteen 
cities that “even the median-length form, with 3800 words, could not be read and fully 
understood by a bright law student in less than an hour”); see also Daniel E. Wenner, Note, 
Renting in Collegetown, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 543, 553 n.62, 555 n.71 (1999) (discussing 
Mueller’s and Berger’s work). 
2112 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
 
surprised by unexpected rules can partially blame meaningful differences between 
the sale of a home and the rental of a unit. Seller disclosure forms often require 
sellers to explain whether the property is part of a POA,216 and a response of “yes” 
might possibly alert a buyer to the existence of rules enforced by the association. 
Title reports should similarly reveal servitudes, and a motivated purchaser could 
search the deeds herself at the county clerk’s office. 
Leasing a residence—a much smaller commitment than home buying—is 
typically a faster transaction involving fewer steps, and thus fewer opportunities 
for notice, than the home-buying process. A lessee looks at an apartment, indicates 
interest, and signs a lease after the landlord has completed a credit check. The 
prospective tenant may see the lease for the first time when she meets the landlord 
to sign it, and the landlord might include an additional packet of rules referenced 
but not included in the lease.217 Further, leases need not be recorded, nor are 
landlords typically required to disclose lease rules to prospective renters prior to 
the stage at which they quickly read and sign the lease.218 A potential renter in an 
apartment building may pick up on some rules from a physical survey of the 
premises,219 but many lease provisions apply to the use of the interior of a unit, and 
renters looking at vacant apartment interiors may lack constructive notice of these 
rules. 
Even if a renter manages to diligently read all of the rules in a lease before 
signing, problems of rule comprehension similar to those in the POA context will 
apply.220 The lease may contain general rules without examples, which do not 
indicate, ex ante, how the landlord will enforce them. And the consequences of 
violating a rule are high; some standard leases provide that a tenant may be evicted 
for a failure to comply with any condition in the lease.221 Renters may obtain some 
                                                 
216 See, e.g., OKLA. REAL ESTATE COMM’N, APPENDIX A. RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY 
CONDITION DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 3 (2012), available at http://www.ok.gov/OREC/ 
documents/Residential%20Property%20Condition%20Disclosure%20Statement%207-1-
12.pdf (asking seller, “Are you aware of a mandatory homeowner’s association?”); TEX. 
REAL ESTATE COMM’N, SELLER’S DISCLOSURE OF PROPERTY CONDITION, 3 (2011), 
available at http://www.trec.state.tx.us/pdf/contracts/op-h.pdf (asking sellers whether they 
are aware of “[h]omeowners’ [a]ssociation or maintenance fees or assessments”). These 
forms do not ask whether the seller is aware of servitudes that attach to the property. 
217 See, e.g., Residential Lease Contract, supra note 139 (containing thirteen 
additional pages of rules incorporated into the lease by reference). 
218 See Mueller, supra note 214, at 257 (concluding from a survey of one hundred 
Ann Arbor tenants that “[a] disturbing forty-six per cent of the tenants stated that they had 
found in their leases terms that were both significant and objectionable and yet that had not 
been mentioned in their oral discussions with the landlord or his agent”). 
219 Ross-Harrington, supra note 23, at 205. 
220 See Berger, supra note 215, at 822 (noting the complexity of leases). But see 
Mueller, supra note 214, at 260 (noting in a college town survey a surprisingly high level 
of comprehension of certain lease provisions). 
221 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-901(a)(3) (Supp. 2009) (allowing eviction 
proceedings to commence when “terms or conditions of the rental agreement have  
been violated”). 
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information about the diligence of the landlord in enforcing rules by speaking with 
other tenants in an apartment building or by looking around.222 An unkempt, 
poorly maintained apartment building may suggest that the landlord is lax in more 
ways than one—in making needed repairs and in enforcing rules. Even for 
detailed, clear rules in the lease, however, which the renter knows the landlord will 
enforce, renters, like homeowners, may not fully internalize the import of rules. 
Renters entering into short-term leases may be even less likely to carefully 
consider how the rules will personally affect them. 
The private community literature’s failure to address tenants’ knowledge and 
understanding of rules that constrain property uses may be justified, in part, by 
several of the differences described in Part II, including differences in the duration 
of property ownership, value interest, and the proximity of living spaces to other 
units. The literature may simply be less concerned about renters’ knowledge and 
understanding of rules up front because renters have short leases that allow for 
relatively easy exit, have a lower interest in the long-term value of the property and 
the assurance that rules will protect these values, and expect more intrusive rules 
when entering a multiunit apartment with shared walls. But as Part II.D.1 
explained, renters’ options for exit are not as simple as they are portrayed to be, so 
a lack of notice of rules may have important implications. Renters also may risk 
receiving less notice of rules than value-driven owners. With respect to the 
proximity of living spaces, owners, too, should expect at least some rules that limit 
uses in a subdivision with shared fences—particularly in light of the increasing 
prevalence of private subdivisions with detailed sets of servitudes. 
In sum, concerns about notice and understanding of rules in private 
governance regimes for property apply in both the ownership and rental context. 
Although some of the differences identified in Part II justify distinguishing the 
notice concerns in each type of community, they do not support the literature’s 
failure to consider tenants’ knowledge and awareness of lease rules. 
 
2.  Producer Failure: Developers’ and Landlords’ Responses to Inaccurate 
Consumer Signals 
 
(a)  Homeowners 
 
The failure of some consumers to notice or understand rules when they 
commit to them may cause distortions in the production of private communities. If 
droves of homeowners are mistakenly signing on to rules that they dislike, then 
developers, by producing communities with these rules, are responding to 
inaccurate preferences.223 Although the developer retains control over the 
community for some time, she does not witness the full “life cycle” of the 
                                                 
222 Ross-Harrington, supra note 23, at 205. 
223 See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 3, at 1113 (explaining why “CICs are not 
necessarily the product of well-functioning market forces”). 
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community, as Professor Clayton Gillette observes.224 Even if she experiences 
initial resident discontent with the rules before turning the subdivision over to a 
POA,225 consumers often may not notice or object to many rules until long after the 
sale, when the developer has moved on. Future consumers of other subdivisions 
built by the same developer, similarly fooled by rules that initially seem beneficial 
(or simply unaware of the rules), may once again agree to the rules only to 
discover after the departure of the developer that they dislike them. 
A second signaling problem at the point of purchase, as noted by Professor 
Fennell, occurs as a result of the large set of rules in subdivisions.226 Even if 
consumers can express displeasure with rules at the point of purchase by refusing 
to buy in a particular subdivision, these are blunt signals. Many private 
subdivisions have numerous pages of rules;227 unless the consumer communicates 
her specific reasons for refusing to buy, the developer will not know which rules 
the consumer dislikes. Consumers also vote for elements other than rules in 
choosing or refusing to buy; a refusal to buy may, unbeknownst to the developer, 
represent an objection to the condition of the golf course, the design of the houses 
in the community, or the quality of the common pool—not a rejection of the rules. 
In addition to responding to potentially inaccurate consumer signals at the 
point of purchase, developers might also offer an inadequate diversity of rules out 
of legal caution, or perhaps, sheer laziness.228 Alternatively, assiduous developers 
often believe that they must offer an unusually comprehensive set of rules to attract 
the first risk-averse residents who move in.229 Without a wide diversity of rules  
to choose from, or with blunt signals, many potential rule preferences may  
remain unexplored. 
 
(b)  Renters 
 
Landlords, like developers, receive primary rule preference signals at the 
point of resident entry into the private community during the signing of the lease. 
Like buyers in a private subdivision, tenants who are not fully informed of the 
rules may provide inaccurate signals for rule preferences, and tenants’ “votes” for 
a full package of rules (by refusing or accepting a lease) are, as in subdivisions, 
                                                 
224 Gillette, supra note 13, at 1429. 
225 For a detailed discussion of developer’s responses to consumer signals, see id.  
at 1429–30. 
226 See Fennell, supra note 13, at 857–58, 873 (describing how rules are bundled not 
only within one package but also with a physical home and subdivision). 
227 See Wiseman, supra note 3, at 747 (describing contents of subdivision 
declarations). 
228 See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 13, at 875 (noting that “the developer might adopt a 
suboptimal set of servitudes if doing so would save her money”); Winokur, supra note 119, 
at 4 (noting increasing uniformity of servitudes). 
229 See Fennell, supra note 13, at 869 (explaining that early homebuyers “are likely to 
desire a high level of protection against uncertainty in the form of restrictive servitudes”). 
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blunt. The landlord, responding to these imperfect signals, may continue to write 
leases with unwanted rules. 
Despite the signaling issues in leases, tenants may have more opportunities 
than homeowners to voice preferences for rules, although the extent to which 
landlords respond to these preferences will vary substantially. Unlike a subdivision 
developer, a landlord sees the full lifecycle of a community. Because the landlord 
maintains control—although not possession—of the property throughout the term 
of the lease, tenants who discover rules several months into the lease may 
complain to the landlord about the content of rules and her enforcement of them; 
these complaints send direct signals about specific rule preferences. Further, the 
landlord, who writes relatively temporary rules, has more opportunities than does a 
subdivision developer to change the rules in response to these signals. Rather than 
building a new subdivision, she need only redraft the lease for each unit upon the 
termination of the prior lease. If there is an adequate supply of rentals in the area 
and tenants are mobile,230 the landlord may be concerned that the complaining 
tenants will not renew their leases if she does not change the rules, and she may 
experiment with new rules in attempting to attract renewals and new, happier 
tenants. Although these modifications cannot typically occur midlease, the fixed 
term of the lease offers readier relief for tenants who live under unwanted rules. 
These assumptions of greater flexibility for rule modification may all fall flat, 
however, in many rental scenarios. As described in Part II, landlords may not be 
willing to negotiate, thus offering tenants few opportunities for exercising the 
voice option, as opposed to voting homeowners’ association members. Many 
tenants—particularly low-income ones—also are immobile due to jobs, income, 
limitations imposed by government-subsidized housing, or simply the considerable 
inconvenience and expense of moving.231 Others, like homeowners, may simply be 
too attached to their community to express displeasure with rules by moving.232 If 
tenants use voice rather than exit strategies to complain about rules, landlords may 
find ways to deny lease renewal or otherwise retaliate,233 and they often may be 
unwilling to bargain for new lease language.234 Where landlords have monopoly 
powers within a municipal area or where rental housing supply is low, they may 
have few incentives to modify rules in response to consumer signals. 
The private community literature has, once again, not considered these factors 
in the rental context—typically describing producer failures only in the creation of 
private subdivisions. This is partially justified by the structural differences 
                                                 
230 See Ellickson, supra note 14, at 1551–52 (noting that “contrary to one of Tiebout’s 
simplifying assumptions, the out-of-pocket and aggravation costs of moving are  
not trivial”). 
231 See id. at 1552. 
232 See id. at 1551–52. 
233 But see Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: 
Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 533–34 (1984) (describing how, after 
the court in Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), prohibited retaliatory 
eviction, many states followed suit). 
234 See supra note 141 (describing landlords’ unwillingness to bargain). 
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described in Part II. This is not to say, however, that rentals should be excluded 
from the sphere of private governance concerns, including incentives for the 
production of private rules. The rules being created in both rented and owned 
private communities may have content that is misaligned with resident preferences 
for a variety of reasons, and lessons from owned communities could transfer well 
to rented ones. Landlords might do well to ask prospective tenants about their 
preferences for rules, for example; at minimum, they could easily consult with 
existing tenants who plan to renew their leases in future years—thus offering an 
opportunity for a new rule set. 
 
C.  Rule Modification 
 
1.  Homeowners 
 
If consumers unknowingly agree to rules that they dislike, or if governments 
are causing the overproduction of rules by requiring developers to form private 
subdivisions,235 residents of these communities must have means of modifying 
despised rules. Unfortunately, residents attempting to modify rules in private 
subdivisions often face insurmountable barriers, as briefly introduced above. Many 
POA bylaws require a supermajority vote for residents to change original 
servitudes.236 There are good reasons for this requirement. As Professor Ellickson 
has observed, individuals often select communities for their rules and the property 
value protection provided by rules. These individuals will face high costs if the 
rules to which they have committed change, and they prefer high barriers to rule 
modification.237 Nonetheless, these barriers raise the stakes for getting the initial 
rules “right.” If consumers are not aware of the rules, know of them but have not 
read them in full, or have read them but do not fully understand their import, then 
consumers’ consent to the rules may be illusory. 
 
2.  Renters 
 
Although POA bylaws tend to place high bars on rule modification, they 
provide formal, albeit difficult, procedures for changing despised rules, as 
described in Part II. Residents may lobby their neighbors for a rule change, and if 
enough of the residents strongly dislike a rule, they might manage to garner the 
supermajority of votes needed for the rule change. Leases do not typically offer 
these types of options for modification once a tenant has signed. A tenant may 
threaten that she will not renew a lease if the landlord refuses to modify it, but low-
income tenants or tenants in areas with insufficient rental supply may lack this 
bargaining power. And although mobile tenants with short-term leases could rid 
themselves of hated rules within a year by moving out, some rules may have 
                                                 
235 See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 3, at 1119. 
236 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
237 Ellickson, supra note 14, at 1558. 
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serious short-term effects. A tenant who may not place a political sign or religious 
symbol in her window, for example, is barred from engaging in an essential 
expressive act. 
The omission of renters from the modification critique may impliedly result 
from differences in the duration of property use and assumptions about exit. As 
already described, however, options for rule modification are important for both 
renters and owners, and the differences in exit considerations for owners and 
renters should not bar a more careful analysis in both contexts. 
Although barriers to rule modification may be problematic both in rented and 
owned communities, they also may have benefits that should be further explored. 
The predictability of a private “contract” for rules allows both tenants and 
homeowners to rely on the rules, knowing that a variance or rezoning, for example, 
will not change them—as could occur in public property governance. And while 
POAs and landlords can grant exceptions to rules, they may be wary of doing so. It 
is relatively difficult to abandon a covenant through lack of enforcement,238 but 
there is evidence that POA members are worried about this possibility and thus 
strictly enforce rules to avoid abandonment or estoppel against future 
enforcement.239 Landlords, too, could potentially face estoppel arguments, and they 
may have even more incentives to maintain rules than would POAs due to their 
value interest in the property. Both tenants and owners, therefore, may prefer the 
relative certainty offered by rules that are difficult to modify. 
 
D.  Rule Enforcement 
 
1.  Homeowners 
 
Even if we assume that the accounts of consumer and production distortions 
suggested in Part III.A are overstated, perfectly good rules selected by knowing 
consumers may still cause problems. Neighbors—not detached government 
officers—enforce covenants, and neighbors monitoring others’ land uses may 
become suspicious of each other.240 When board meetings about rule enforcement 
are held in living rooms,241 decisions can appear closed and “clubby.” 
In addition to inspiring neighborly distrust, private subdivisions endow an 
“official” group of neighbors, the elected homeowners association, with strong 
enforcement powers.242 These neighbors are tasked with enforcing servitudes, 
                                                 
238 See Wiseman, supra note 3, at 753 (briefly describing the requirements for 
abandonment through nonenforcement). 
239 Id. (describing warnings by the Community Association Institute to its board 
members, advising them to enforce rules to avoid abandonment). 
240 See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 3, at 1132–33 (noting that “miscommunication, 
acrimony and abuse of power . . . have arisen in virtually all States with large numbers  
of CICs”). 
241 See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 46,  
at 16. 
242 See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 3, at 1132. 
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providing community services such as trash removal and common-area 
maintenance, and collecting fees to support these functions. Although these 
associations must follow minimal procedural requirements contained in the 
community association bylaws, and in some states they must follow additional 
requirements like holding open meetings,243 they have broad discretionary powers. 
These powers operate against a backdrop of the equally powerful threat of 
foreclosure. In many states, a resident’s failure to comply with association 
servitudes or rules, including a failure to pay association fees, can lead to 
foreclosure by the association.244 Wielding these broad discretionary powers 
backed up by a substantial threat, POA boards comprised of neighbors may 
unevenly or even spitefully enforce servitudes against individuals whom  
they dislike.245 
 
2.  Renters 
 
Rental communities are, like private subdivisions, cultures of rules. 
Particularly in apartment buildings with shared common space, landlords include 
rules in leases that look identical to servitudes in private subdivisions. These rules 
govern the use of individual units as well as common areas, prohibiting tenants 
from, for example, placing signs in windows, hanging flags on units, hanging 
decorative lights, or allowing pets on the premises. The rules, like those in a 
private subdivision, are also enforced by a private entity in the form of the 
landlord, but the enforcement mechanism may not inspire as much distrust and 
neighborly angst as that identified by Professors Franzese and Siegel in private 
subdivisions. Tenants generally cannot sue each other for lease violations. 
The landlord’s relationship with the tenant, however—similar to a POA’s 
relationship with an owner—can be strained and, in the worst scenarios, bordering 
on dictatorial.246 Even if the landlord does not ultimately initiate eviction 
proceedings, she may threaten eviction to force a tenant to comply with a host of 
unreasonable or unevenly enforced rules. Indeed, some standard leases allow 
eviction for seemingly inconsequential tenant noncompliance, such as the failure to 
change a light bulb.247 
                                                 
243 See Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 57, at 615 (citing FLA. STAT. § 617.303(2) 
(1993), which has been renumbered and amended as FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.303 (Supp. 
2012)) (requiring POA meetings to be open). 
244 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
245 See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 3, at 738 n.270 (describing private community 
residents’ experiences with allegedly retaliatory enforcement of servitudes). 
246 See, e.g., supra note 144 and accompanying text (describing retaliatory eviction). 
247 See, e.g., Residential Lease Contract, supra note 139 (“25. CONDITION OF THE 
PREMISES AND ALTERATIONS. . . . When you move in, we’ll supply light bulbs for 
fixtures we furnish, . . . after that, you’ll replace them at your expense with bulbs of the 
same type and wattage. . . . 32. DEFAULT BY RESIDENT. You’ll be in default if . . . you 
or any guest or occupant violates this Lease Contract . . . . Eviction. If you default, we may 
end your right of occupancy by giving you a 24-hour written notice to vacate.”). 
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Enforcement mechanisms in owned and rented private communities differ 
substantially, thus potentially supporting the failure of the private community 
literature to discuss tenants’ experience with biased or unfair enforcement. 
Although landlords and POAs both have wide discretion in enforcing the rules, and 
this discretion is largely unchecked by courts, landlords act unilaterally, and 
associations must act by consensus (at least of the board), as described in the 
structural differences in Part II. But as Part II also noted, although landlords 
directly represent their own value interests in enforcing rules, they might  
not represent tenants’ preferences, which are to avoid arbitrary and unfair  
rule enforcement. 
 
E.  Rule Substance: Private Rules as Overly Intrusive 
 
1.  Homeowners 
 
In addition to identifying procedural problems with servitudes, a strong line 
within the public community literature has harshly critiqued rule substance. It has 
honed in most closely on rules that control owners’ daily uses of property,248 
worrying that these rules unnecessarily constrain individual freedoms and interfere 
with owner expectations. Scholars’ discomfort with these rules seems to be rooted 
in a belief that they run counter to core property expectations. When individuals 
cannot wear flip-flops in the park, install a swing set, grow a garden, or put a 
political sign in their window or yard, their enjoyment of life may indeed be 
meaningfully limited. As Professor James Winokur argues, “Servitude regimes 
have generated growing resident dissatisfaction with ‘strait jacket’ restrictions 
which invade aspects of home life previously left to personal choice,”249 leading to 
litigation between residents and POAs.250 Similarly, Professor Susan French 
observes that “[d]reams of homeownership can turn sour . . . for people who learn 
too late that they will not be permitted to put up political signs, for sale signs, or 
holiday decorations.”251 
As the “too late” language suggests, many of these concerns about substance 
must be tied intrinsically to notice, unless they are founded on some notion of 
inherent and unalterable property rights. If individuals entering a community are 
aware of the content of rules and fully understand the impacts of rules on their 
future lives, then they are purposefully choosing to live under intrusive restrictions. 
Others may not like all or some of the rules but may choose to live in the 
community because they prefer other aspects—the price, location, or amenities—
                                                 
248 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes  
249, 251. 
249 Winokur, supra note 119, at 4; see also id. at 5 (arguing that servitudes in private 
subdivisions have begun to “undercut . . . the personal liberties of existing residents and 
potential buyers”). 
250 Id. at 4. 
251 Susan F. French, The Constitution of a Private Residential Government Should 
Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 349 (1992). 
2120 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
 
more than they dislike the unpalatable rules. In any case, for residents who 
voluntarily agree to these rules, scholarly objections about rule substance should 
likely be limited to the impacts of these rules on society, unless we believe that 
individuals simply should not have the option to select certain types of freedom-
constraining rules for their living spaces. 
 
2.  Renters 
 
The largest hole in the private community literature is its tendency to omit 
renters from its concerns about rule substance—particularly because the literature 
focuses so closely on rules that constrain daily uses. A rule banning an individual’s 
placement of a political sign in her yard or window has the same effect on the 
individual whether it arises from a lease or servitude. Either way, the tenant or 
owner cannot express herself on election day. Indeed, the rule may have stronger 
adverse effects on the tenant, who has a smaller property and perhaps less space 
with which to express herself and engage in the other activities necessary to form 
her identity. 
Overly intrusive rules that prohibit individuals’ freedoms to use property as 
they wish typically have reasons for being so intrusive. Even low-income tenants 
who lack much choice in selecting a rental community may potentially prefer 
certain private rules that could help to deter crime, for example, or ensure basic 
upkeep. To the extent that either homeowners or renters were unaware of these 
rules when they committed to them or did not fully understand their import, 
however, they may pose legitimate concerns that must be addressed in both rented 
and owned private communities. 
Despite the potential need for protections from certain intrusive rules, private 
community scholars and the law often ignore the fact that renters are subject to the 
very types of rules that are criticized in the homeowner context, and often to more 
of these rules.252 While many states have not implemented the Restatement’s 
suggestions for limiting community association rules, they have prohibited 
servitudes that restrict a wide array of homeowners’—but not renters’—property 
uses. North Carolina’s amendments to its laws governing POAs, which were 
intended “to provide greater protections for homeowners,” for example, prohibit 
restrictions on flying the North Carolina or U.S. flag.253 Florida is similarly 
concerned about owners’ freedoms, providing that servitude and association rules 
in the state “may not preclude the display of one portable, removable United States 
flag by property owners.”254 California, in turn, previously provided that 
                                                 
252 See Fennell, supra note 15, at 1056. 
253 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1598, 1602 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-121(1) 
(2011)); see also Paul Boudreaux, Homes, Rights, and Private Communities, 20 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 479, 509 & n.172 (2009) (citing to this statute and, throughout the 
article, describing many state laws that constrain POA rules). 
254 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3075(3) (West 2010). 
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association-governing documents may not prohibit common interest community 
residents from keeping “at least one pet.”255 
Some states’ bars on use restrictions more sensibly apply to both servitudes 
and lease conditions. California, for example, prohibits “a written instrument 
entered into relating to real property” from restricting “the use or occupancy of the 
property as a family day care.”256 The federal government, in turn, has recognized 
two use rights that tenants must have: the right to install a television antenna 
(which also applies to homeowners in subdivisions),257 and, in federally assisted 
rental housing, to own a pet if the tenant is elderly or disabled.258 Maryland also 
allows elderly tenants to keep pets “unless specifically prohibited in writing at the 
time occupancy took place.”259 Hawaii, in turn, allows tenants to post political 
signs.260 Most states, however, have focused more closely on the content of 
servitudes and community association rules. 
The sole focus on homeowners in the context of rule substance is unjustified, 
and it finds little support in tenant-owner differences. As shown by the 
Restatement’s explicit reliance on “the traditional expectations of property 
owners” in opposing rules that restrain owners’ uses of property, tradition seems to 
be the primary justification.261 As Part II discusses, however, there is now a long 
tradition of detailed rules in owned communities. And even if one attempted to 
justify more intrusive rules in rental communities simply because there has been a 
“tradition” of detailed rules in these communities, this fails to explain whether this 
tradition is beneficial to renters. 
Other factors from Part II also could potentially support some of the focus on 
rule intrusiveness in the ownership context. California’s former guarantee that 
owners, but not renters, may keep a pet262 appeared to recognize the value 
distinction. Landlords must keep value-disinterested tenants from damaging the 
unit, and pets may cause extensive damage. California did not cite this 
                                                 
255 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1360.5(a) (West 2007) (repealed 2012; repeal operative 2014); 
see also Boudreaux, supra note 253, at 508 n.169 (citing to this statute). But see CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.40(b) (West Supp. 2012) (prohibiting certain restrictions 
on the running of day cares and not limiting this use protection to owned properties). 
256 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.40(b). 
257 See Restrictions Impairing Reception of Television Broadcast Signals, 47 C.F.R. § 
1.4000(a)(1) (2011). 
258 Angela S. Robinson, Pets & Community Housing, MD. BAR J., Sept. 2007, at 30 
(citing National Affordable Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §1701r-1 (2006)). 
259 Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-214(c) (LexisNexis 2010)). 
260 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-52(c) (LexisNexis 2006). 
261 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.7 cmt. b (2000). 
262 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1360.5(a) (West 2007) (repealed 2012; repeal  
operative 2014). 
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consideration in passing its legislation, however, instead focusing on the emotional 
benefits that pets provide to homeowners.263 
In sum, more explanation for the focus on the privilege of the home is needed. 
Eduardo Peñalver has observed that “ownership of a home constitutes a physical 
space for habitation and socializing that owners can (within limits) tailor to their 
own particular tastes and plans, something that is much more difficult for renters to 
do.”264 It is not clear that we are justified in assuming that renters should not have 
these same opportunities of “habitation and socialization” within their physical 
space or freedom from rules that impede these opportunities. 
 
F.  Social Externalities of Private Community Contracting 
 
The private community literature, although forgetting the lowly tenement 
dweller and her experience with rental rules, has noted the many external effects of 
private, owned communities—including effects on low-income populations. As 
briefly introduced in Part II, scholars have explored the problematic exclusionary 
tendencies of subdivisions, for example. As individuals with a variety of  
incomes flock to apartments, the omission of rentals from this analysis  
becomes problematic. 
 
1.  Homeowners 
 
Private POAs “can effectively segregate social classes,265 and Professor Lior 
Strahilivetz has poignantly described how POAs, through proxies, might also 
exacerbate racial divisions.266 Deeds that contain covenants to pay high monthly 
fees for the maintenance of a fancy golf course for association residents, for 
example, may not only keep out low-income residents from a private community; 
they also may send a signal that certain races are not welcome within the private 
“club.”267 Public communities face serious, lingering challenges of race and class 
division,268 but private subdivisions may allow for easier and more destructive 
                                                 
263 See S. Judiciary Comm., Bill Analysis, A.B. 860, 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 
2–3 (Cal. 2000), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/ab_0851-
0900/ab_860_cfa_20000809_102600_sen_comm.html. 
264 Peñalver, supra note 156, at 836. 
265 Winokur, supra note 119, at 4; see also Franzese, supra note 13, at 578 n.176 
(collecting the extensive literature on private community exclusion). 
266 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 
92 VA. L. REV. 437, 470–76 (2006). 
267 See id. at 472–73. 
268 Malcolm M. Feely, The Personal and the Professional: Assessing the Ambivalent 
Commitment to Racial Justice in the United States, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 503, 511 (2010) 
(observing that “racial isolation in many areas has reached or is near all-time highs”); 
Leland Ware, The Demographics of Desegregation: Residential Segregation Remains High 
40 Years After the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1155, 1155 (2005) 
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separation, particularly when they are gated269—as they often are—or include 
unusually detailed rules or high fee requirements. A community that prohibits 
residents from parking trucks or vans in driveways may exclude as many groups as 
would a lavish fee requirement for golf course maintenance. 
Related to concerns about divisions of race and class, Professor Sheryll 
Cashin worries that private subdivisions reduce residents’ sense of obligation to 
the broader community.270 Individuals move to a community governed by a 
homeowners’ association in part to obtain quality services funded by a monthly 
fee. Residents sometimes then request tax breaks, arguing that they have paid for 
their own services and need not pay a second tax.271 Professor Cashin worries that 
private communities thereby discourage redistribution and stifle an ethic of 
community-wide responsibility.272 Professor Frug expresses similar concerns, 
criticizing the trend in private communities, schools, and other formerly public 
institutions toward viewing public services as efficient transactions that enhance 
individual welfare rather than supporting a collective group.273 He also notes 
private communities’ contribution to Americans’ fear of crime and their attempts 
to isolate themselves from “strangers” and “different” people, pinpointing the 
flight to the suburbs as a problem.274 Although Professor Frug blames both public 
and private communities for the perpetuation of fear,275 private subdivisions are 
conducive to isolation; they allow individuals to build an exclusive suburban 
community within walls.276 
                                                 
(observing that “many of . . . [the nation’s] cities are more segregated today than they were 
in 1964”). 
269 But see Ron Levi, Gated Communities in Law’s Gaze: Material Forms and the 
Production of a Social Body in Legal Adjudication, 34 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 635, 651 (2009) 
(concluding, from the small set of cases that have addressed nonresidents’ access to gated 
communities, that “nonresidents cannot be barred when there are continuing and 
empirically determinable relationships with the community”). This does not address, of 
course, the concern that certain classes of people are excluded from living within these 
communities. 
270 Cashin, supra note 12, at 1690–91. 
271 See, e.g., id. at 1677 (“Several states, including Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, 
and Texas, already allow for adjustments in local taxes for residents of CIDs to reflect 
services provided by their residential associations.”); Franzese & Siegel, supra note 3, at 
1121 & n.53 (noting New Jersey’s Municipal Services Act, which requires the state to 
either provide private communities with municipal services or reimburse the communities 
for their services costs incurred (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:67-23.2 to -23.8 (West 1992 
& Supp. 2012))). Note that Franzese and Siegel worry about residents paying double  
taxes, whereas Cashin views the attempts to shirk taxes as another example of  
problematic secession. 
272 Cashin, supra note 12, at 1686. 
273 Frug, supra note 12, at 29–30. 
274 Id. at 76–77. 
275 Id. at 76. 
276 Id. at 71 (“Ask people why they want to build a wall around their neighborhood, 
and they’ll say, ‘security.’”). 
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2.  Renters 
 
Just as homeowners choosing to live in a private subdivision collectively 
generate externalities, tenants do not solely bear the effects of the lease. 
Particularly around universities, developers increasingly offer upscale luxury 
rentals that have doormen and gates, promising students a safe living area with 
comfortable amenities.277 These contribute to the same exclusion and anti-
redistributive concerns that apply to subdivisions, yet the private community 
literature has ignored these problems. 
To some extent, the focus in the private community literature on the social 
externalities of owned but not rented private communities is justified by the spatial 
differences described in Part II. Single-family homes have stronger social and 
environmental effects than do multiunit structures. Indeed, some state legislatures 
seem to have recognized this difference in the environmental context, at least 
indirectly—banning servitudes (but not leases) that prohibit the installation of solar 
panels or low-water landscaping. In Florida, for example, servitudes that would 
“prohibit any property owner from implementing Florida-friendly landscaping” 
(landscaping that “protects the state’s water resources”)278 are banned. California 
similarly declares as void and unenforceable any provision of a community 
association governing document that “[p]rohibits, or includes conditions that have 
the effect of prohibiting, the use of low water-using plants as a group,” water use 
restrictions, or water-efficient landscapes.279 At least one state has recognized 
(perhaps incidentally) that multiunit apartment buildings can have similar effects. 
Arizona’s ban on the prohibition of solar panels, for example, applies to “[a]ny 
covenant, restriction, or condition contained in any deed, contract, . . . or other 
instrument affecting the transfer or sale of, or any interest in, real property.”280 
Beyond environmental concerns, single-family homes—particularly those in 
subdivisions—do have unique (and negative) social effects on individuals outside 
of private communities, as introduced in Part II. Although the gated luxury 
apartment has also become somewhat of a phenomenon,281 new, creative rentals 
for low-income and other disadvantaged tenants are beginning to offset  
these externalities.282 
Despite the legitimate differences between rented and owned communities in 
the context of social effects, the literature would do well to more closely 
                                                 
277 See, e.g., supra note 175. 
278 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3075(4) (West 2010); see also Boudreaux, supra note 253, 
at 482 n.11 (citing to this statute). 
279 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1353.8(a) (West Supp. 2012). 
280 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-439(A) (2007) (emphasis added). It is not clear, 
however, that a court would consider a lease provision a restriction or condition. 
281 See supra note 175. 
282 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 110, at 377–78 (describing various apartment 
buildings for the elderly and low- and moderate-income residents in Jamaica  
Plain, Boston). 
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investigate the trend toward luxury rentals, particularly as residents of a variety of 




The rental community—and particularly the multiunit apartment building—
falls so naturally within the private community sphere perhaps because its 
functions and purpose are nearly identical to those of the private subdivision, the 
classic private community. Landlords impose a set of uniform rules to, inter alia, 
reduce conflicts among property users in close proximity, thus ensuring short-term 
value for residents and long-term protection of property value.284 POAs mimic this 
model, overcoming individual owners’ temptations to use their property as they 
wish and imposing a uniform rule set that constrains all neighbors, again in an 
attempt to protect short- and long-term property values. 
Despite rental properties’ definitional fit within the private community and 
the fundamental similarities between rented and owned private communities, the 
literature has not defined rented property as a private community. Nor has it 
adequately explained why its extensive analyses of the benefits and flaws of these 
communities consistently omit tenants, aside from the occasional nod to tenants 
within private, owned communities, such as subdivisions.285 As explored in this 
Article, the legitimate differences between rented and owned communities only 
weakly support private community scholars’ omission of rentals from their specific 
critiques of private communities. Differences in the type of space occupied, for 
example, partially explain concerns about rule notice in the owner context, as 
prospective owners of single-family homes may not expect intrusive rules. So, too, 
might the duration of the stay expand concerns about owners who lack upfront 
understanding of the rules and have trouble modifying them. But renters of 
multiunit apartments and homeowners both occupy shared communities—whether 
they live on neighboring lots or in neighboring units—and develop strong if not 
identical ties to those communities. Ultimately, private community scholars’ focus 
on homeowners’ experiences with use-limiting rules seems primarily rooted in 
tradition, a justification that continues to lose force as subdivisions become more 
and more a part of modern life. 
Importantly, however, the omission of rentals from private community 
critiques does not prove that the critiques lack merit, only that they have not been 
taken to their logical conclusion. Indeed, private community scholars may be 
pleased to explicitly include renters within the reach of their arguments. And as the 
number of renters continues to rise286 in the wake of a real estate decline not seen 
                                                 
283 See Newcombe, supra note 18, at 27 (describing well-to-do individuals flocking to 
urban rentals). 
284 See supra Part I.C.1–2. 
285 See supra note 23. 
286 JOINT CENTER FOR HOUS. STUDIES, supra note 17, at 2 (“[A]lmost all Americans 
rent at some point in their lives. Among the population that reached adulthood around 
1980, fully 95 percent lived in rentals sometime during the ensuing two decades . . . .”). 
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since the Great Depression,287 increased attention to the well-being of tenants 
would be welcome. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that the size of the task 
facing the critics of private governance has increased significantly: private 
governance of rental property is ubiquitous, and for better or worse, long accepted. 
As this Article has demonstrated, whether private communities are good, bad, 
or some of both, rental communities must be counted among them. This opens the 
door to an exchange of concepts between landlord-tenant law and the law of 
private communities, exploring how creative mechanisms from both fields can 
improve rules and governance systems in apartments and homes alike. If tenants 
enjoy protections from arbitrary rule enforcement in some states, so, perhaps, 
should subdivision owners—keeping in mind the rental-owner variations that will 
require different types of protective rules for homeowners. If private bylaws, in 
turn, protect homeowners by constraining POA discretion, so, arguably, should 
similar laws apply to landlord decisions. 
It is time for the paths of landlord-tenant and private community law and 
scholarship, which currently run a parallel course, to intersect. This Article 
embarked upon the first stage of this project, placing rentals solidly within the 
private community framework. Going forward, the debate must extend past the 
castle walls and into the tenements. 
                                                 
287 See Dickerson, supra note 188, at 189 (describing “one of the worst foreclosure 
crises since the Depression”); JOINT CENTER FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., 
supra note 17, at 2 (noting that “the housing bust and Great Recession have pushed up the 
share and number of renter households” and predicting that “further increases in the renter 
population are likely”). 
